Subsequent bail is denied absent changed circumstances where identification and DNA support serious POCSO charges.

The appellant filed his first criminal appeal under Section 14-A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, seeking bail in connection with Crime No. 422/2024 registered at Police Station Kamla Nagar, Bhopal, for offences under Sections 74, 75(1), 63, 64(2)(i), 65(2) and 115(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and Sections 3, 4, 5(m), 5(f), 6, 7, 8, 9(m), 9(f), 10, 11(i) and 12 of the POCSO Act, 2012.

The appellant had remained in custody since 16 September 2024.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant committed penetrative sexual assault upon a girl aged approximately three-and-a-half years.

The appellant relied upon the medical examination report, which recorded no external or private-part injuries, redness or swelling, and argued that the prosecution version was doubtful.

The appellant’s previous bail application had been dismissed as withdrawn on 27 March 2025, and his subsequent Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court had also been withdrawn on 14 July 2025.

Whether the appellant was entitled to bail under Section 14-A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, considering the medical, identification and DNA evidence relied upon by the prosecution?

Whether the absence of injuries, CCTV footage or conclusive male DNA, together with the period of custody, constituted a sufficient change in circumstances warranting bail?

Whether bail should be granted when the appellant’s earlier bail application had been withdrawn, the subsequent SLP had also been withdrawn, and all prosecution witnesses had already been examined?

The Court considered the appellant’s appeal under Section 14-A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, in relation to the offences alleged under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the POCSO Act, 2012.

The general principles that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception,” and that bail should ordinarily not be refused absent risks such as flight from justice or interference with evidence, were relied upon by the appellant from State of Rajasthan, Jaipur v. Balchand @ Baliay, (1977) 4 SCC 308, and Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240.

In deciding bail, the Court assessed the prima facie prosecution material, including the victim’s identification of the appellant and the DNA report, the procedural history of earlier bail proceedings, and the stage of trial.

Although the appellant relied on the absence of injuries, CCTV footage and male DNA, the Court found that the prosecution case was supported by the victim’s identification of the appellant in the TIP and by the DNA report implicating him through the presence of the victim’s DNA in his clothes.

The Court therefore did not treat the medical findings or alleged deficiencies in the scientific evidence as sufficient, at the bail stage, to displace the prosecution material.

The Court also noted that the earlier bail application had been withdrawn, the SLP had subsequently been withdrawn, and no material change in circumstances was established.

Since all prosecution witnesses had already been examined and the trial was not being delayed, continued custody was not attributable to prosecutorial delay; consequently, the period of detention did not justify release on bail.

It held that the victim’s identification of the appellant, the adverse DNA report, the absence of any material change after withdrawal of the earlier bail application and SLP, and the imminent conclusion of the trial justified rejection of bail.

Accordingly, the criminal appeal seeking bail under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act was dismissed.