Subsistence claims by co-operative society secretaries are not maintainable before the Act’s controlling authority.

The second respondent, a Secretary of the petitioner Society, was suspended on 1 February 2015.

The Society initiated surcharge proceedings under Section 87 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983; the surcharge order was upheld on appeal, and the second respondent did not challenge that decision further.

Following disciplinary proceedings, his service was terminated on 3 August 2019, an order he also did not challenge.

He applied to the first respondent for subsistence allowance for the suspension period, and the first respondent directed payment of ₹16,02,688 on 4 March 2024.

The Society challenged that order by writ petition.

1. Whether the second respondent, employed as a Society Secretary, was an “employee” entitled to claim subsistence allowance under the Tamil Nadu Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1981.

2. Whether the first respondent’s order could stand when it had not considered the applicable special bye-laws and the Division Bench decision in W.A. No. 1901 of 2026.

Section 2(a) of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1981 defines “employee” but excludes a person employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; it also excludes certain supervisory employees exercising mainly managerial functions.

Rule 149 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules, 1988 was relevant to the possible application of special bye-laws governing Society employees.

The Division Bench in W.A. No. 1901 of 2026 held that an application under the Subsistence Allowance Act was not maintainable before the competent authority in the circumstances considered there, while permitting the employee to apply to the Society and, if aggrieved, seek revision under Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983.

The Court considered that the second respondent’s position as Secretary brought him within the managerial or administrative exclusion in Section 2(a), and that the Division Bench decision was relevant to the maintainability of his claim before the first respondent.

It also found that the first respondent had not examined whether special bye-laws under Rule 149 applied.

Because that issue had not been considered, the Court quashed the order and remitted the matter for a fresh decision informed by the Division Bench’s views.

The authority was directed to complete the exercise as expeditiously as possible, preferably within six months.

No costs were ordered, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.