Successive bail requires changed circumstances; prolonged custody alone cannot justify bail for an absconding accused.

The appellant/accused, Sanju, was prosecuted in S.C. No. 826/2018 for offences under Sections 326A, 307 and 153 of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

The prosecution alleged that, at approximately 5:50–6:00 a.m. on 7 June 2017, the appellant poured acid on the neck and chest of the de facto complainant, a member of a Scheduled Caste, with an intention to cause his death, resulting in serious burn injuries.

The appellant allegedly left the country on the date of the incident and remained absconding for approximately five years.

He was subsequently apprehended in connection with another crime, and his arrest in the present case was recorded through a production warrant.

He had been in custody since 8 October 2025.

The appellant’s earlier application for regular bail was rejected by the Special Court.

His appeal against that order was dismissed by the High Court in Crl. Appeal No. 2001/2025 on 27 November 2025, and the Supreme Court dismissed his Special Leave Petition on 23 April 2026.

The second bail application was rejected by the Special Court on 3 July 2026.

The appellant challenged that order under Section 14A of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

Whether the appellant demonstrated a material change in circumstances sufficient to maintain and allow his second application for regular bail, particularly on the basis of his passport records allegedly showing departure from India on the date of occurrence?

Whether the alleged delay in framing charges and conducting the trial, invoking the accused’s right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, justified release on bail?

Whether, considering the seriousness of the acid attack, the appellant’s five-year abscondence, criminal antecedents and the risk of fleeing or threatening the victim, bail ought to be denied?

The Court exercised appellate jurisdiction under Section 14A of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, in relation to the appellant’s challenge to the rejection of regular bail.

The alleged offences included Sections 326A, 307 and 153 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

The Court applied the settled principle that a successive bail application ordinarily requires a genuine and material change in circumstances after rejection of the earlier application.

It also considered the constitutional right to a speedy trial under Article 21, referring to Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehta v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 4 SCC 134, and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 9 SCC 813.

These general bail principles must be assessed against the particular facts, including the accused’s abscondence, the gravity of the offence, the possibility of evasion of trial, and the risk of further harm to the victim.

The Court found no substantive change in circumstances warranting reconsideration of the appellant’s second bail application.

The passport-based argument was not accepted because the appellant’s counsel had withdrawn the contention after recognising that the prosecution case placed the occurrence between 5:50 and 6:00 a.m., whereas the alleged departure relied upon by the appellant was later on the same day.

The Court further held that the delay argument did not justify bail at that stage because further investigation had been completed, a supplementary final report had been filed, and the Special Court was thereafter at liberty to frame charges and proceed with the trial.

The Court gave substantial weight to the appellant’s alleged five-year abscondence after the incident, his criminal antecedents, and the fact that he had been arrested in the present case through a production warrant while in custody in another case.

These circumstances created a serious apprehension that he might flee from justice if released.

Given the nature of the alleged offence—an acid attack causing serious burn injuries—and the victim’s apprehension of further harm, the Court held that the ordinary considerations favouring bail could not override the need to secure the accused’s presence at trial and protect the victim.

The alleged trial delay was insufficient, in the circumstances, to justify release under Article 21, particularly because further investigation had concluded and the trial could proceed.

Considering the gravity of the acid attack, the appellant’s prolonged abscondence, criminal antecedents and risk of evading trial or causing harm to the de facto complainant, the Court confirmed the order rejecting regular bail.

The criminal appeal was accordingly dismissed, and a copy of the judgment was directed to be forwarded to the Special Court, Mannarkkad.