Successive co-accused disclosures establishing a prima facie link justify refusing discharge at the pre-trial stage.

An FIR was registered under Sections 15(C) and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“NDPS Act”) after recovery of 73 bags of poppy husk weighing 16 quintals 10 kilograms from a canter in the possession of co-accused Gurmeet Singh, Salwinder Singh @ Sona and Sukhpal Singh @ Mani.

During investigation, co-accused Gurmeet Singh’s disclosure statement led to the nomination of Janak Raj, who allegedly had taken the canter on rent.

On the basis of Janak Raj’s subsequent disclosure statement, the petitioner was nominated on the allegation that he and Janak Raj had jointly purchased and loaded the contraband in Jharkhand for transportation to the Gidderbaha area.

The petitioner was arrested, and the challan was presented against all accused.

The petitioner sought discharge under Section 250 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”), corresponding to Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”), contending that he had been implicated solely through a co-accused’s disclosure statement, that no recovery was made from him, and that his alibi, supported by photographs, hotel records and toll receipts, made his presence in Jharkhand impossible.

He also alleged non-compliance with Sections 42, 50 and 57 of the NDPS Act and illegality in his arrest.

The Special Judge dismissed the discharge application, leading to the revision petition before the High Court.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to discharge under Section 250 of the BNSS on the ground that the material collected by the prosecution did not disclose a sufficient prima facie case against him.

Whether the petitioner’s defence based on the inadmissibility of the co-accused’s disclosure statement, absence of recovery, alibi, alleged NDPS procedural violations, and illegality of arrest could be adjudicated at the stage of discharge.

Section 250(2) of the BNSS requires discharge where, upon consideration of the prosecution record and after hearing the parties, the Court finds insufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

At the stage of discharge or framing of charge, the Court must determine whether the prosecution material discloses a prima facie case or grave suspicion; it is not required to conduct a detailed trial or conclusively assess the probative value of the evidence.

This principle was drawn from P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398, Union of India v. Prafulla K. Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4, Vishnu Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 AIR SC 90, State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, AIR 2020 SC 554, State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap, AIR Online 2021 SC 210, Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 10 SCC 591, and Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368.

The Court further applied the rule that the accused’s defence and documents produced by him ordinarily cannot be weighed at the stage of framing charge; the assessment is confined primarily to the prosecution material.

The Court held that the prosecution material disclosed a prima facie case against the petitioner.

His implication did not arise from an isolated statement: the disclosure of Gurmeet Singh led to Janak Raj’s nomination, and Janak Raj’s subsequent disclosure connected the petitioner with the alleged joint purchase, loading and intended delivery of the contraband.

At the discharge stage, the Court was not required to determine whether the disclosure statement would ultimately constitute admissible or sufficient substantive evidence, nor whether the petitioner’s alibi would succeed at trial.

The photographs, hotel records and toll receipts relied upon by the petitioner required evidentiary proof and did not, on their face, render the prosecution case inherently impossible.

Similarly, the alleged violations of Sections 42, 50 and 57 of the NDPS Act, absence of call-detail records, non-ownership of the canter, and alleged defects in arrest were matters for trial and did not negate the existence of a prima facie case at that stage.

The petitioner’s revision petition challenging the dismissal of his discharge application was accordingly dismissed, and the order of the Special Judge was upheld.

The Court clarified that its observations were confined to the adjudication of the discharge petition and would not prejudice the parties on the merits at trial.