Sufficiency of Prima Facie Evidence of Matrimonial Harassment and Physical Assault Justifies Framing Charge Under Section 306 IPC

The petitioner (husband) married the deceased, Kamini @ Gudiya, in June 2015.

On 17.04.2024, the deceased committed suicide by hanging.

An FIR was registered under Sections 306/34 IPC based on the father’s complaint alleging continuous harassment and physical abuse.

Investigation recovered a handwritten diary (entries from 13.04.2024 to 17.04.2024) and Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements from family members alleging assaults.

On 22.04.2026, the Trial Court discharged the petitioner’s family members due to vague allegations but directed framing of charge against the petitioner under Section 306 IPC, noting specific material of physical and mental harassment.

The petitioner challenged this order of framing charge.

Whether the material collected during investigation prima facie discloses the essential ingredients of "abetment" under Section 107 IPC to justify a charge under Section 306 IPC.

Whether the alleged incidents were too remote in point of time to have a proximate nexus with the suicide.

Whether the High Court should interfere with the Trial Court’s order on charge in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

Section 306 of the IPC (Abetment of suicide) and Section 107 of the IPC (Definition of abetment).

Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander (2012) regarding the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction, holding that interference is warranted only if allegations are patently absurd or basic ingredients are missing.

Nipun Aneja v. State of UP (2024) and Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab (2020), which necessitate a clear allegation of instigation or proximate nexus for a Section 306 IPC conviction.

Section 397/401 Cr.P.C. (equivalent to BNSS provisions) regarding the standard of "grave suspicion" required at the stage of framing charge.

The Court observed that at the stage of framing charge, it must only determine if there is "grave suspicion" rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt.

It rejected the petitioner’s argument that the diary entries exonerated him, stating that the diary is only one piece of evidence that must be read alongside Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements of the family members who alleged consistent physical and mental harassment.

The Court highlighted that the Trial Court did not act mechanically, as evidenced by the discharge of other family members while retaining the petitioner based on specific allegations of proximity and physical assault.

The Court held that the evaluation of whether these acts constitute "instigation" is a matter for trial, and selective appreciation of evidence is impermissible at the revision stage.

It held that the material on record raises sufficient grounds to proceed against the petitioner under Section 306 IPC and that issues regarding the appreciation of evidence and the petitioner’s probable defense are matters to be adjudicated during trial.