SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND INJUNCTION FILED DECADES AFTER KNOWLEDGE OF ALLEGED FRAUD IS TIME-BARRED.

The Appellant/Plaintiff, Manoj Kumar Narang, filed a suit (CS DJ 509/2022) for Declaration and Permanent Injunction to declare two Sale Deeds dated 31.12.1996 as null and void, asserting they were obtained through fraud.

He sought a declaration of ownership to the extent of a 1/6th share, having inherited a 1/24th share from his late mother, Smt. Moran Devi, and restraining Defendants/Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 from creating third-party interests in the property.

The Appellant claimed he, his two brothers, and his mother were absolute owners of the suit property, having purchased it via multiple Sale Deeds in 1989 and 1994.

He alleged that Respondent No. 1 and his father fraudulently pressurized his family to transfer a 3/4th share, and that his mother agreed to sell on the condition that 1/4th of the property on each floor, including roof rights, would be retained.

The Appellant contended that he only became aware in August 2021 that Respondent No. 1 had sold the entire suit property to Respondents Nos. 2 to 4, who began new construction.

He asserted that the alleged Sale Deeds of 31.12.1996 were fraudulently obtained.

The Defendants/Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 argued that the suit was barred by Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as the right to sue accrued on 31.12.1996, and the suit filed in 2022 was beyond the three-year limitation period.

They also stated that the Appellant was not in possession and had not sought the relief of possession.

Respondent No. 5, the Appellant's brother, asserted that other legal heirs of Smt. Moran Devi were necessary parties.

The Ld. District Judge rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC as time-barred and devoid of cause of action and dismissed an application for amendment to seek possession.

Whether the "Right to Sue first accrued" for Sale Deed No. 1 on 31.12.1996 or in August 2021.

Whether the Suit filed by the Appellant/Plaintiff on 01.04.2022 is barred by the Limitation Act, 1963.

Whether the suit is devoid of any cause of action.

Whether the Ld. Trial Court erred in dismissing the Appellant's application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC before deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

Whether the suit was maintainable without impleading all legal heirs of Late Smt. Moran Devi.

The court primarily applied Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which allows for the rejection of a plaint if it is barred by any law, including the law of limitation.

It extensively referred to Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a three-year limitation period for suits to obtain any other declaration, reckoned from "when the right to sue first accrues".

The court also referenced Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for the period of limitation for cancellation or setting aside an instrument, which begins when facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled become known to him.

The principle from *Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd.* (Supra) was relied upon, stating that the period of limitation begins when the right to sue first accrues, and successive violations do not create fresh causes of action.

Additionally, the court cited *NDMC Vs. Prashant Narula* and *Sudhakar Vs. P. Buchi Reddy*, which state that a suit for declaration and injunction is not maintainable without seeking possession if the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property.

The Court analyzed the facts in light of the Limitation Act, 1963, specifically Article 58 regarding the accrual of the right to sue.

It found that the Appellant, being an executor of Sale Deed No. 1 dated 31.12.1996, was aware of its contents and any alleged fraud at the time of its execution.

Despite the Appellant's claim that the cause of action arose in August 2021 when he learned of new construction, the court concluded that the right to sue "first accrued" on 31.12.1996, making the suit filed in 2022 time-barred as per Article 58.

The court distinguished the Appellant's reliance on Article 59, stating that Article 58 was applicable to the declaration sought.

It emphasized the term "first" in "right to sue first accrued," meaning that subsequent events do not create a fresh limitation period once the initial right has accrued.

The argument that the Appellant was in constructive possession was rejected due to lack of material evidence and the undisputed fact that Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 were in actual possession.

Consequently, the failure to seek the relief of possession rendered the suit for declaration and injunction not maintainable.

Regarding the mother's Sale Deed, the court noted that the Appellant could not proceed alone without impleading all legal heirs of Late Smt. Moran Devi, including Respondent No. 5.

The trial court's dismissal of the amendment application was found justified as the suit itself was time-barred.

It concluded that the Suit No. 509/2022 was time-barred, as the right to sue first accrued on 31.12.1996, and the limitation period expired in 1999.

The suit was also devoid of a cause of action, both because of the limitation bar and the Appellant's failure to seek the relief of possession despite not being in actual possession.

Furthermore, the suit contesting Sale Deed No. 2 was not maintainable due to the non-joinder of all necessary legal heirs of Late Smt. Moran Devi.

The Appeal was dismissed, and all pending applications were disposed of accordingly.