Suo motu revisional powers must be exercised within reasonable time; 21-year delay invalidates subsequent revenue proceedings.

The petitioner in SCA 2876/2014, Vinubhai Shah, was issued an agriculturist certificate in 1966.

Based on this, he purchased land in 1966 and 1988.

Revenue authorities initiated show-cause notices (SCN) under Section 54 read with Section 75 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Land Ordinance, 1949, in 1984 and 2006, alleging the petitioner was not a bona fide agriculturist; however, both proceedings were dropped/withdrawn by the Deputy Collector after verifying the petitioner’s documents.

Subsequently, the heirs of the original seller (Respondent 3) challenged the 2010 withdrawal.

In 2011, the Collector allowed the appeal, quashed the Deputy Collector's order, and directed the land to be vested in the Government.

In the connected SCA 2919/2014, similar suo motu proceedings were initiated against Ramniklal Shah regarding 1985 entries after a delay of approximately 21 years.

In SCA 6700/2016, a subsequent purchaser challenged the SSRD's rejection of his revision against the Collector’s 2011 order.

1. Whether the revenue authorities can exercise suo motu revisional powers after an inordinate delay (specifically 21 years) where no statutory limitation is prescribed?

2. Whether the principle of res judicata applies to revenue proceedings where the same issue was previously adjudicated and dropped?

3. Whether the heirs of a seller, who have already received sale consideration, qualify as "aggrieved persons" with locus standi to challenge revenue orders in favor of the purchaser?

4. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable despite the availability of an alternative remedy (Revision to SSRD)?

The Court applied Sections 54 and 75 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed Ordinance, 1949, regarding restrictions on land transfer to non-agriculturists.

It relied on the doctrine of res judicata as codified in Section 11 of the CPC to prevent multiplicity of proceedings.

Regarding the exercise of suo motu powers, the Court followed State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha (1969), establishing that such powers must be exercised within a "reasonable time".

On the issue of "aggrieved persons," it applied Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra (2013), holding that a stranger or person without legal injury cannot meddle in proceedings.

Finally, it applied Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) regarding the maintainability of writs when fundamental rights are violated or jurisdiction is exceeded.

The Court reasoned that while the Ordinance does not prescribe a limitation period, suo motu powers must be exercised within a reasonable timeframe to prevent settled titles from being perpetually uncertain; a delay of 21 years was deemed unreasonable.

The Court found that since the Deputy Collector had twice dropped the proceedings after considering the same merits, the authorities were barred by res judicata from reopening the matter.

Regarding locus standi, the Court held that the sellers' heirs were not "aggrieved persons" as the original owner had pocketed the sale consideration and never challenged the sale deed during his lifetime; thus, they could not use revenue proceedings to reclaim land.

Regarding maintainability, the Court held that because the Collector's order was passed in violation of fundamental rights and was "wholly without jurisdiction" due to the delay and prior adjudications, the "rule of alternate remedy" was not a bar.

SCA 2876/2014 was partly allowed; the Court quashed the Collector's 2011 order vesting the land in the Government.

The Court declined to quash the 2013 eviction orders against the petitioner's daughter and grandson (Smitaben and Setul) as they were not petitioners in the present case, though it granted them liberty to pursue independent legal recourse.

The Court reaffirmed that transactions remaining valid for a considerable period cannot be unsettled by delayed revenue interference.