Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 excludes interference with discretionary injunctive orders unless the exercise is palpably erroneous.

The petitioner filed a civil suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction regarding property in Raipur, asserting it was ancestral property in which she held an equal share as the daughter of respondent No. 1

Conversely, the respondents contended the property was the self-acquired asset of respondent No. 1 via a registered will dated 08.02.2001, which he subsequently gifted to respondents No. 2 and 3

Along with the suit, the petitioner sought a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the CPC to restrain the respondents from alienating the property

The Trial Court dismissed the application on 28.02.2026, finding no prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable loss

This was upheld by the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Raipur, in a Miscellaneous Civil Appeal on 11.03.2026

The petitioner then moved the High Court under its supervisory jurisdiction

1. Whether the lower courts exercised their discretion arbitrarily or perversely in refusing the grant of a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the CPC

2. Whether the High Court should interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts under the supervisory jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution of India

The court applied Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the CPC, which governs the discretionary grant of temporary injunctions based on the tripartite test of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss

It relied on the principle established in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd., which dictates that an appellate court shall not substitute its own discretion for that of the trial court unless the original exercise of power was arbitrary, capricious, or perverse

Furthermore, the court invoked the limited scope of Article 227 of the Constitution, citing Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. and Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, which restrict supervisory interference to cases of "palpably erroneous" jurisdictional errors

The court also noted the statutory protection offered by the principle of lis pendens

The court observed that the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case, as the respondents produced evidence (a registered will) suggesting the property was self-acquired rather than ancestral

The High Court emphasized that injunctive relief is a discretionary remedy, not an inherent right

Applying the Wander Ltd. doctrine, the court reasoned that because the Trial Court’s view was "reasonably possible" based on the material provided, the appellate court was correct not to interfere

The court further noted that the petitioner’s interests are protected by the doctrine of lis pendens, which renders any alienation during litigation subject to the final outcome of the suit, thereby obviating the absolute necessity for a specific restraining order

Under Article 227, the High Court’s role is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors; since the lower courts' orders were not "palpably erroneous," no intervention was warranted

The court affirmed that the discretionary power under Order 39 was exercised reasonably and in a judicial manner

Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed, and the orders of the lower courts refusing the temporary injunction were upheld