Suppression of prior knowledge negates urgency, justifying revocation of leave to bypass mandatory pre-institution mediation.

In brief

The question

1. Whether the mandate for pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act can be bypassed by a proforma or deceptive plea of "urgent interim relief."

The court held

The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the Single Judge revoking the leave granted under Section 12A

It also directed

The Court held that when a plaintiff suppresses prior knowledge of a defendant's activities, the subsequent plea for "urgent interim relief" cannot be used to bypass the mandatory pre-institution mediation requirement under the Commercial Courts Act

All connected applications were dismissed with no order as to costs

01Facts

The Appellants (Plaintiffs) filed a commercial suit for trademark infringement and passing off against the Respondents (Defendants) regarding the use of the mark "Really," which was allegedly deceptively similar to the Appellants' mark "RALLI"

¶ 3, 6

The Appellants initially obtained ex parte leave under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and an ad-interim injunction on September 30, 2024

¶ 13-14

The Respondents subsequently moved to revoke the leave and vacate the injunction, arguing that the Appellants suppressed prior knowledge of the Respondents' business

¶ 15

Evidence indicated both parties participated in a Pune trade fair in 2018 where the products were displayed, and WhatsApp messages from 2022 showed the Appellants’ high-ranking officials were aware of the Respondents' products and pricing

¶ 6, 23-24

The Single Judge revoked the leave and dismissed the injunction application, leading to this appeal

¶ 1-2, 16

02Issues

i.1. Whether the mandate for pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act can be bypassed by a proforma or deceptive plea of "urgent interim relief."

¶ 17-20

ii.2. Whether the Court has the power to revoke leave granted under Section 12A if it finds the plea of urgency was a camouflage to avoid mediation.

¶ 21

iii.3. Whether the Appellants established a genuine need for urgent interim relief despite evidence of prior knowledge of the alleged infringement since 2018.

¶ 22-25

03Law Applied

The Court applied Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which mandatorily requires pre-institution mediation unless a suit "contemplates urgent interim relief"

¶ 17

It relied on Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi (2024) 5 SCC 815, which established that a prayer for urgent relief must not be a "disguise or mask" to wriggle out of Section 12A and that courts must holistically examine the need for urgency from the plaintiff’s standpoint

¶ 17

It further cited Novenco Building and Industry A/S v. Xero Energy Engineering Solutions Private Ltd. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2278, confirming that while courts do not judge the merits of the relief at the Section 12A stage, the urgency must be "plausibly" genuine and not a device to skip mediation

¶ 18

The Court distinguished Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. Pioneer Trading Corporation (2017) 242 DLT 488, noting that imputed knowledge depends on the specific facts and rank of the employees involved

¶ 26-27

Provisions in the judgment · 1 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 7

04Reasoning

The Court affirmed that Section 12A is a mandatory statutory provision and that the right to bypass it is not absolute

¶ 19-20

It reasoned that if leave is obtained through "deception and falsity," the Court is not powerless to recall it

¶ 21

Applying this to the facts, the Court found the Appellants’ claim—that they only became aware of the infringement in 2024—was "unacceptable"

¶ 25

The evidence of the 2018 Pune trade fair and the 2022 WhatsApp exchanges between high-ranking officials demonstrated that the Appellants had knowledge of the Respondents' mark for several years

¶ 23-24, 27

Consequently, the "urgency" pleaded in 2024 was deemed a camouflage to bypass the mandatory mediation process, as the long delay in filing the suit contradicted the claim of immediate peril or irreparable harm

¶ 22, 25