Supreme Court acquits man in POCSO case, citing identification doubts and prosecution’s failure to examine key teacher witness

The prosecution alleged that the appellant sexually assaulted the 11-year-old daughter of the informant, who had an intellectual disability, at her home on 28 May 2015.

The FIR was lodged on 8 June 2015, after the victim’s cousin and, later, her schoolteacher had reportedly been told of the incident.

The Special Judge convicted the appellant under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and the Meghalaya High Court affirmed the conviction.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court considered, among other matters, the witnesses’ identification evidence, the delay and omissions in the FIR, the non-examination of the teacher, and the defence evidence supporting alibi.

Whether the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of the victim and other material witnesses, established the appellant’s identity and guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the delay in lodging the FIR, material omissions and improvements, and non-examination of the schoolteacher undermined the prosecution case.

Whether the evidence that the appellant was seen near the house attracted Section 106 of the Evidence Act, and whether the defence evidence of alibi affected the case.

The prosecution must prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, aggravated penetrative sexual assault attracts the prescribed punishment; however, the charge must still be proved through reliable evidence.

An FIR need not be an encyclopaedia, but omission of material facts later relied on to connect the accused with the offence may undermine the prosecution version (*Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh*, (2018) 9 SCC 137; *Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P.*, AIR 1975 SC 1026).

Where an available witness is material to the genesis or an essential part of the prosecution case, unjustified non-examination may support an adverse inference (*Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing*, (2001) 6 SCC 145).

Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not shift the burden to an accused merely because the accused was seen nearby; the prosecution must first establish the relevant incriminating circumstance, such as the accused and victim having been seen together.

The Court found that the victim and her cousin did not identify the appellant in court and acknowledged that the appellant’s name had been supplied by the victim’s mother; the victim also said she had been told by the prosecutor what to say.

The mother’s account was materially doubtful, including her response to the cousin’s alleged disclosure, while the FIR omitted both that disclosure and the allegation that the appellant had been seen near the house—facts later relied on at trial.

The schoolteacher, whose alleged disclosure prompted the FIR, was not examined without explanation.

The medical witnesses’ evidence could not be relied on because the defence had not been given an effective opportunity to cross-examine them.

The Court also held that seeing the appellant in the garden did not establish that he and the victim were last seen together, so Section 106 did not shift the burden; it further found the defence evidence supporting alibi credible and insufficiently addressed by the courts below.

Taken cumulatively, these deficiencies made the conviction unsafe.

It set aside the trial court’s conviction and sentence and the High Court’s judgment, acquitted the appellant, and directed his release forthwith unless required in another case.