Supreme Court Cannot Condone Re-filing Delay Beyond Statutory Timelines Under Section 62 of IBC

The Appellant, serving as the liquidator of a corporate debtor, challenged an order passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) dated December 8, 2025

The appeal was filed under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) on January 29, 2026—7 days beyond the initial 45-day limitation period but within the 15-day grace period

However, the registry marked the appeal as defective. The Appellant cured the defects and re-filed the appeal after a further delay of 82 days, exceeding the 28-day re-filing window prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules (SCR), 2013

The Appellant contended that as a neutral officer, his administrative lapses should be viewed leniently

1. Whether the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to condone a delay in re-filing an appeal under Section 62 of the IBC when the defects are not cured within the 28-day period prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules

2. Whether the strict statutory timelines of the IBC prevail over the discretionary power to condone re-filing delays under the Supreme Court Rules

The Court applied Section 62 of the IBC, which mandates a 45-day limit for filing appeals, extendable by only 15 days upon showing "sufficient cause," creating an absolute outer limit of 60 days

It relied on Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd. and V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat & Power Ltd., establishing that IBC timelines are strict, time-bound, and mandatory to ensure insolvency resolution

Furthermore, it integrated Order VIII, Rule 6(3) and (4) of the Supreme Court Rules (SCR), 2013, which provides a 28-day window for curing registry defects

The Court reasoned that an appeal filed within the 60-day IBC window but containing defects is not a valid "institution" of an appeal if it is incapable of being acted upon by the Registry

It rejected the Appellant's argument for a liberal construction of "sufficient cause," holding that allowing a litigant to cure defects "at leisure" would circumvent the rigors of Section 62 and render the IBC’s discipline nugatory

The Court clarified that while re-filing delays are typically treated leniently under general civil law, the IBC is a "complete code" where the lis "stands frozen" if defects are not cured within the SCR-mandated 28 days

The Court distinguished its previous order in the same litigation (which had condoned a re-filing delay), noting that the prior order was specifically marked as "not to be treated as a precedent" and that serial condonations across successive appellate stages would defeat the legislative objective of finality

The Court found no cogent justification for the 82-day re-filing delay, stating that administrative lapses within a liquidator's office do not warrant the invocation of Article 142 to override express statutory timeframes

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as time-barred