Suspension period must be treated as duty upon acquittal where the disciplinary authority passes a non-speaking order.

The applicant, a Peon in the Revenue Department, was suspended on 28.08.1998 following a CBI criminal case

He was convicted by the Trial Court in 2005, but the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi eventually set aside the conviction on 08.10.2010, granting him the "benefit of doubt"

Simultaneously, the respondents initiated departmental proceedings in 2009 for separate irregularities. Although a fresh inquiry was initially ordered after the first inquiry found no proof, the Disciplinary Authority (DA) eventually quashed the fresh inquiry and dropped all charges on 23.03.2018

Despite the acquittal and exoneration, the DA issued an order on 27.03.2018 directing that the suspension period (1998–2005) be restricted to the subsistence allowance already drawn and not be treated as "spent on duty," instead classifying it as leave

1. Whether the Disciplinary Authority was legally justified under FR 54-B in treating the suspension period as "not spent on duty" despite the applicant's acquittal in the criminal case and exoneration in departmental proceedings

2. Whether the impugned order dated 27.03.2018 qualified as a reasoned and speaking order as required by law

The court primarily applied Fundamental Rule (FR) 54-B, which mandates that when a suspended employee is reinstated, the competent authority must specifically consider whether the period shall be treated as "spent on duty" and determine the pay and allowances

Under FR 54-B(3), if suspension is "wholly unjustified," the employee is entitled to full pay and the period must be treated as duty

The Tribunal also relied on the precedent of Jagdamba Singh v. Union of India (OA No. 603/2014), affirmed by the Delhi High Court, which held that where an acquittal is based on the "benefit of doubt," the suspension period should still be considered for treatment as duty for consequential benefits

The Tribunal observed that while the DA has the power to decide on the treatment of suspension periods, FR 54-B(1) requires a reasoned and speaking order

The Tribunal found the impugned order dated 27.03.2018 to be "mechanical" and "non-speaking," as it failed to provide any cogent reasons for denying the "spent on duty" status despite the applicant being cleared in both criminal and departmental venues

The Tribunal highlighted that as a Class-IV employee, treating the suspension as leave would impose a significant and unfair financial burden on the applicant’s pensionary benefits

Following the ratio in Jagdamba Singh, the Tribunal reasoned that an acquittal—even one based on the "benefit of doubt"—should lead the DA to take a lenient view, especially when the departmental charges were also dropped

The court answered the issues by holding that the DA's decision was overly harsh and lacked legal reasoning

The Respondents were directed to treat the suspension period from 28.08.1998 to 26.04.2005 as "spent on duty" and grant all consequential benefits to the applicant within eight weeks