Suspicion cannot replace proof where medical evidence is inconclusive and oral testimony is hearsay.

The deceased was in a romantic relationship with Respondent No. 1, Sastu Ram, and consequently conceived.

The prosecution alleged that on or around February 2013, Respondents No. 1, 2, and 3 took the deceased to Respondent No. 4, Sitapati, to perform an illegal abortion using herbal medicine and abdominal pressure.

The deceased’s condition deteriorated, and she died during treatment at Holy Cross Hospital on 06.02.2013 due to septicemia.

Following a trial in Sessions Case No. 231/2013, the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Surguja, acquitted the respondents of charges under Section 314 read with Section 34 of the IPC via judgment dated 07.03.2019.

The State preferred this appeal against the acquittal, contending that medical and oral evidence sufficiently linked the respondents to the illegal abortion and subsequent death.

1. Whether the trial court was justified in acquitting the accused persons of the charge under Section 314 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

2. Whether the prosecution established a complete chain of circumstantial evidence to overcome the presumption of innocence in an appeal against acquittal.

The Court applied Section 314 of the IPC (death caused by act done with intent to cause miscarriage) and Section 34 of the IPC (common intention).

Procedurally, the Court relied on Section 378 of the CrPC regarding appeals against acquittal.

It followed the principles established in Jafarudheen and others v. State of Kerala (2022), which mandates that appellate courts should be "relatively slow" in reversing acquittals unless the trial court’s view is implausible, reinforcing the "double presumption" of innocence.

It further integrated the criteria from Mallappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2024), which dictates that if two views are possible, the one favoring the accused must be followed, and reversal requires a finding of illegality or perversity.

The Court found the prosecution's case fundamentally lacked direct evidence.

While the medical examiner (PW-4) confirmed the cause of death as septicemia, he admitted in cross-examination that no definite signs of abortion or premature delivery were present.

The testimonies of the deceased’s parents (PW-3, PW-6) and brother (PW-1) regarding the abortion were categorized as hearsay, as they admitted they did not witness the accused taking the deceased for the procedure or the procedure itself.

Furthermore, the Court noted critical investigative gaps: the prosecution failed to examine a local practitioner who treated the deceased prior to her hospitalization, failed to produce independent witnesses from the village where the abortion allegedly occurred, and failed to seize any instruments or substances used for the act.

The Court reasoned that the prosecution's case rested on grave suspicion, which cannot substitute for legal proof.

It concluded that the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances pointing unerringly toward the guilt of the respondents.

Consequently, the Court found no patent illegality or perversity in the lower court's decision.

The acquittal appeal was dismissed at the admission stage, and the judgment of the trial court was upheld.