Technical resignation for appointment to superior post in same department does not require deposit of one month’s salary.

The eight petitioners were originally employed as Assistant Teachers (LB) within the School Education Department. Upon being selected for the superior post of Teacher (English/Science/Mathematics) through a recruitment process, they submitted "technical resignations" to join their new appointments.

The Respondent No. 4 (District Education Officer) accepted these resignations conditional upon the petitioners depositing one month’s salary, which the petitioners paid under protest to ensure they could join the new posts within the stipulated timeframe.

The petitioners subsequently filed representations on 11.08.2025 and 18.03.2026 seeking a refund of the deposited salary, arguing that such a deposit is not required for departmental promotions or appointments to superior posts within the same department.

1. Whether the petitioners are entitled to a refund of the one month’s salary deposited during the submission of their technical resignations for appointment to a superior post within the same department.

2. Whether the Court should direct the respondent authorities to decide the pending representations submitted by the petitioners regarding the refund.

The Court considered the administrative principles governing "technical resignation," which generally apply when a government servant move from one post to another within the government through proper channels, preserving past service benefits.

The court relied on the principle of administrative fairness and the obligation of state authorities to adjudicate representations involving financial recovery from employees in accordance with law.

The petitioners contended that because they remained within the same department and were moving to a superior post, the requirement to pay one month's salary in lieu of notice (standard for ordinary resignations) was inapplicable to their "technical resignation".

The Court did not rule on the merits of the refund claim itself. Instead, it focused on the procedural lapse of the Respondents in failing to decide the petitioners' representations.

Given that the State’s counsel raised no objection to a direction for a timely decision, the Court determined that the Respondent No. 4 is legally obligated to pass a reasoned and speaking order on the merits of the petitioners' claim for a refund.

The decision must be made on its own merits within a period of three months from the receipt of the order. Additionally, the petitioners were granted liberty to file fresh representations, which the authority must consider alongside the pending ones.