Termination based on inquiry findings regarding unframed charges violates principles of natural justice.

The litigation involves two separate challenges by a school management ("Petitioners") against orders of the School Tribunal in favor of a teacher ("Respondent No. 1").

In the first instance (WP 3267/2007), Respondent No. 1 was terminated on May 26, 2006, following an inquiry into allegations of assault and misconduct.

The School Tribunal set aside this termination on March 16, 2007, citing management prejudice and procedural flaws, and ordered reinstatement with backwages.

Despite no interim stay, the Petitioners failed to reinstate her.

Subsequently (WP 4099/2017), Respondent No. 1 alleged she was prevented from joining duties on April 7, 2012, which she challenged as "otherwise termination".

The Tribunal again ruled in her favor on January 27, 2017, directing reinstatement and imposing costs of ₹50,000.

Respondent No. 1 superannuated on December 31, 2022, during the pendency of these proceedings.

The Court applied the principles of natural justice, specifically the requirement that findings of misconduct must be based on formally framed charges.

It relied on the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as clarified in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, which restricts interference to cases of patent perversity, gross failure of justice, or flouting of basic principles of natural justice.

The Court also referenced Ahilyabai Holkar Shikshan Prasarak v. Venkatrao, noting that a Tribunal may interfere when proceedings are inconsistent with statutory rules or the rules of natural justice.

Regarding the 2006 termination, the Court observed that while the inquiry committee found Respondent No. 1 guilty of assaulting the headmistress, no such specific charge was framed in the original charge sheet.

This discrepancy constituted a breach of natural justice.

Furthermore, the Court noted the Tribunal’s finding of deep-seated prejudice, as the headmistress was the wife of the institution's chairman and the management had ignored prior Education Department directions.

Regarding the 2012 "otherwise termination," the Petitioners failed to produce evidence (such as muster rolls or proof of summons) to support their claim that the teacher refused to work; conversely, the teacher provided correspondence showing she was actively blocked from signing the muster.

The Court highlighted the Petitioners' "conduct" in willfully disobeying Tribunal orders for nearly two decades as a primary reason to decline discretionary relief.

The Court held that the inquiry was vitiated by a lack of fair play and that the 2012 incident clearly constituted "otherwise termination".

The interim stay on the payment of costs was vacated, and the Petitioners were directed to pay ₹50,000 within four weeks.

Additionally, the Court maintained oversight of the Education Department to ensure the release of backwages and pensionary benefits, requiring further affidavits from the Director and Education Officers to explain their long-standing failure to enforce the Tribunal's 2007 directions.