Termination by an Authority Lacking Jurisdiction is Void Ab Initio, Entitling the Employee to Reinstatement with Full Benefits

The petitioner was appointed as Shiksha Karmi Grade-III on July 20, 2007

On July 7, 2008, the Collector, Durg, terminated her services and directed the lodging of an FIR after her higher secondary mark-sheet was allegedly found to be forged

The petitioner was subsequently acquitted by a criminal court

In a previous round of litigation (WPS No. 3455 of 2020), the High Court held that the Collector had exceeded his jurisdiction in passing the termination order and directed the respondents to decide on her representation

Pursuant to this, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Janpad Panchayat Navagarh issued an order on March 12, 2021, re-appointing the petitioner as an Assistant Teacher (Panchayat) on a fresh two-year probation period

The petitioner challenged this order, seeking reinstatement from the original date of appointment with consequential benefits instead of a fresh re-appointment

1. Whether the respondent authority was legally justified in treating the petitioner’s return to service as a fresh "re-appointment" rather than "reinstatement" given the jurisdictional defect in the original termination

2. Whether an order passed by an authority lacking jurisdiction is void ab initio, thereby entitling the petitioner to continuity of service

The court primarily applied Rule 9 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Shiksha Karmi (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997, which stipulates that the administrative and disciplinary control of Shiksha Karmis vests with the Zila or Janpad Panchayat, not the Collector.

Specifically, the Rule designates the General Administration Standing Committee as the disciplinary authority for major punishments and the CEO for minor punishments.

Furthermore, the court applied the settled principle of administrative law that an order passed by an authority without jurisdiction is void ab initio

The court reasoned that since the Collector, Durg, was not the designated disciplinary authority under Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules, the termination order dated July 7, 2008, was issued by usurping jurisdiction

While the previous coordinate Bench in 2020 did not formally set aside the termination, it had recorded a categorical finding that the order was without jurisdiction and passed without a departmental inquiry

The court observed that because an order without jurisdiction is a nullity (void ab initio), there was no legal "termination" in the eyes of the law that required a "re-appointment"

Therefore, the CEO’s decision to re-appoint the petitioner on probation was arbitrary and illegal, as it ignored the legal consequence of the jurisdictional defect

The petitioner was entitled to be placed back in her original position as if she had never been removed

The Court further ordered that the petitioner is entitled to all consequential benefits, treating her appointment as continuous from her original date of joining, July 20, 2007