Termination of a probationer is punitive where determined misconduct forms its foundation, requiring disciplinary procedure.

The Petitioner joined the Delhi Pollution Control Committee (“DPCC”) as a Junior Environmental Engineer on 6 December 2021, on probation for two years.

Before completion of probation, DPCC terminated his services on 10 March 2023 under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, by granting one month’s pay and allowances in lieu of notice.

The termination order did not disclose any reason or allegation of misconduct.

The Petitioner’s departmental appeal, filed on 9 May 2023, was rejected on 13 September 2024, following which he approached the High Court.

The record contained several show-cause notices alleging threats, intimidation, altercations, misconduct, insubordination and failure to perform official duties.

DPCC asserted that the complaints were verifiable or supported by evidence and that the Petitioner’s explanations were unsatisfactory.

A probationer has no indefeasible right to continue in service merely because the probationary period has not expired, and an employer may ordinarily discontinue a probationer on the basis of an overall assessment of suitability under a termination-simpliciter clause.

However, the employer cannot use such a clause to impose punishment for misconduct without complying with the applicable disciplinary procedure.

The distinction between motive and foundation is decisive: complaints may constitute the motive for assessing suitability where the employer leaves the allegations unresolved, but misconduct becomes the foundation of termination where the employer examines the allegations, rejects the employee’s explanation, treats the misconduct as established and terminates the employee on that basis.

The Court relied on Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, (1984) 2 SCC 369; A.P. State Federation of Cooperative Spinning Mills Ltd. v. P.V. Swaminathan, (2001) 10 SCC 83; State Bank of India v. Palak Modi, (2013) 3 SCC 607; Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology v. Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar, (1992) 4 SCC 719; State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 569; Government of NCT of Delhi v. Dalbir Singh, W.P.(C) 6596/2023, decided on 6 September 2023; and New Delhi Municipal Council v. Rahul Kumar, 2026:DHC:6505-DB.

Rule 5(1) and the contractual power to terminate during probation cannot authorise punitive termination for misconduct without due process.

The Court held that the termination order, viewed alone, was non-stigmatic, but its legal character had to be determined from the material forming the basis of the decision.

The show-cause notices went beyond recording complaints: they described the Petitioner’s conduct as “gross misconduct” and “wilful insubordination,” and threatened disciplinary action.

DPCC’s counter-affidavit stated that the complaints were verifiable or supported by evidence, that the Petitioner’s replies lacked merit or were unsatisfactory, and that his conduct constituted misconduct under the CCS (Conduct) Rules.

DPCC also stated that “in view of” those facts, the Petitioner’s services were terminated.

The Court found no independent probation report or contemporaneous performance assessment supporting DPCC’s asserted overall suitability assessment; the material relied upon predominantly concerned specific acts characterised as misconduct.

Consequently, the allegations were not merely the motive for a decision not to continue the Petitioner, but constituted the substantive foundation of the termination.

Since DPCC had effectively acted upon a finding of misconduct without conducting the requisite disciplinary inquiry, the termination was punitive and legally unsustainable.

The Court clarified that the mere issuance of show-cause notices or consideration of complaints would not automatically make a termination punitive; the decisive factor was DPCC’s treatment of the allegations as established misconduct.

DPCC was directed to reinstate the Petitioner within four weeks.

Reinstatement did not amount to confirmation, and his status and further continuation were left subject to the applicable rules and lawful orders.

The Court declined back wages because there was no material showing that the Petitioner remained without gainful employment and because the allegations had not been adjudicated.

The Petitioner was, however, granted continuity of service for other service purposes.

DPCC remained at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings regarding the allegations in accordance with law, without the judgment prejudicing either party.