The Board may authorize its Executive Engineer to initiate Section 95A eviction proceedings.

The petitioners were tenants or occupants of Issa Building, a dilapidated building undergoing redevelopment under Regulation 33(7) of the Development Control and Promotion Regulations, 2034.

The owners had obtained MHADA permissions, and approximately 57 of the building’s 83 tenants had surrendered possession and executed permanent alternate accommodation agreements (PAAAs).

The petitioners challenged proceedings under Section 95A of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (MHADA Act), contending that the Executive Engineer lacked jurisdiction and that the owners had not complied with conditions of the NOC, including those concerning PAAAs, transit accommodation or rent, corpus, and a rehabilitation construction-cost deposit.

The respondents maintained that the Executive Engineer had been authorised to act, and that the relevant NOC conditions applied at different stages of redevelopment.

The Court heard the connected petitions together.

1. Whether proceedings initiated by the Executive Engineer under Section 95A of the MHADA Act were without jurisdiction or contrary to the statutory scheme.

2. Whether alleged non-compliance with NOC conditions made the Section 95A proceedings premature or illegal.

Section 95A of the MHADA Act provides for summary eviction where the statutory prerequisites for redevelopment are met, including the required occupier consent and issuance of an NOC; it also requires alternate temporary accommodation or rent in lieu.

Sections 16 and 18 establish the MHADA Act’s administrative structure, identify the Chief Officers of Boards as authorities charged with carrying out the Act, and provide for the Board to function through its officers.

Section 181 concerns delegation of powers exercisable by the Authority and does not require every Board function performed by its officers to be treated as a separate delegation.

A statutory discretion is ordinarily exercised by the authority on which it is conferred, but that principle may be displaced by contrary indications in the statute’s language, scope, or object.

Section 95A is a summary procedure, not a forum for trying every dispute relating to redevelopment; affected occupants must receive notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

The Court also considered Radhika George v. MHADA, Sayed Anwar Gafoor v. Administrator and Divisional Commissioner, Sahni Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, Vasant Kheraj Bhanushali v. Goregaon Siddharth Nagar Sahakari Grih Nirman Sanstha Ltd., Javed Abdul Rahim Attar v. MHADA, and Jugraj Tejraj and Sons v. Executive Engineer, E-1 Division, MBR and R Board.

The Court rejected the jurisdictional challenge because Sections 16 and 18 make the Chief Officer part of the Board’s statutory administrative machinery, and the record showed both an earlier Board administrative order assigning Section 95A actions to the Executive Engineer and a specific authorisation by the Chief Officer for the action in this case; those orders were not challenged.

Section 181 did not apply because the case did not involve delegation of the Authority’s powers.

On the NOC conditions, the Court accepted the respondents’ evidence that transit rent and corpus had been offered and deposited with MHADA after the occupants did not accept them; the 10% rehabilitation-cost deposit was due before demolition, which had not begun; and the PAAAs were required before the developer sought the relevant NOC for a plinth-level commencement certificate.

The Court found no current breach that invalidated the Section 95A action, accepted the owners’ undertaking to provide rent and corpus and register PAAAs on the terms applicable to other tenants, and noted the authority’s undertaking to act if non-compliance were established.

It also distinguished Javed Abdul Rahim Attar and Jugraj Tejraj on the grounds that the former concerned Section 79-A and the latter did not decide the Executive Engineer’s authority to issue notices.

It dismissed all the writ petitions, discharged the rule, made no order as to costs, and stated that the authorities were expected to ensure compliance with the NOC conditions and act in the event of any breach.