The first day is excluded when computing a limitation period for acts to be done "within" a specified time.

The Petitioner, an industrial unit, expanded its operations under the North East Industrial and Investment Promotion Policy, 2007 (NEIIPP) and commenced commercial production on 29.03.2017

Under Clause (vii) of the Central Capital Investment Subsidy (CCIS) Scheme Operational Guidelines, claims for subsidy must be filed "within one year from the date of commencement of commercial production"

The Petitioner filed its claim on 29.03.2018

The Respondent Authorities rejected the claim in multiple meetings held between 2019 and 2022, asserting the application was filed on the 366th day and was therefore time-barred by one day

1. Whether the application filed by the Petitioner on 29.03.2018 was within the prescribed period of "one year from the date of commencement of commercial production" (29.03.2017) as per Clause (vii) of the Operational Guidelines.

The court primarily applied the principle of "exclusion of the first day" in the computation of time as established in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897

It relied on the Supreme Court precedents of Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal, which held that when an act must be done "within" a specified period from a given date, the day on which the cause of action arose is excluded; Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd. and Econ Antri Ltd. v. Rom Industries Ltd., which reaffirmed this rule in different statutory contexts; and Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v. Dinanath Sharma, which clarified that the word "from" indicates the opening day must be excluded to avoid prejudice to the claimant

The Court analyzed the phrase "within one year from the date of commencement of commercial production" found in Clause (vii) of the Guidelines

Applying the established rules of construction, the Court determined that because the word "from" was used, the starting date (29.03.2017) must be excluded from the one-year calculation

By excluding 29.03.2017, the limitation period began on 30.03.2017 and concluded at the end of 29.03.2018

The Court reasoned that this interpretation is necessary to ensure parties receive the full benefit of the allotted time, particularly if the event triggering the period (commencement of production) occurred late in the day

Consequently, the Petitioner's filing on 29.03.2018 was found to be on the final day of the permissible window, not one day late

The Court set aside the impugned minutes of the meetings dated 06.04.2019, 10.10.2019, and 17.08.2022 that rejected the claim on the grounds of delay

The Respondent Authorities were directed to consider the Petitioner’s claim on its merits, subject to necessary verification, and to complete the exercise within six months. The writ petition was disposed of in favor of the Petitioner