The scope of Section 53A’s six-year limitation requires determination by a larger Bench.

By a registered Deed of Conveyance dated 21 May 2004, land measuring 37,954.20 sq. metres at Oshiwara, Mumbai, was conveyed to a partnership firm subsequently converted into Petitioner No. 1 company.

The property was conveyed on an “as is where is” basis and was substantially affected by slums, encroachments and Development Plan reservations.

Before execution, the Collector adjudicated the instrument under Section 31 of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 and determined stamp duty at ₹13,00,000, which was paid by the petitioners.

In 2005, proceedings were initiated under Section 53A of the Act alleging undervaluation. Although the petitioners participated in the hearing, the first order demanding deficit duty was passed only on 21 March 2013, nearly eight years later, requiring payment of ₹3,10,32,950.

In earlier writ proceedings, the High Court directed the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority to decide the revision on merits.

After further hearings, inspections and written submissions, the Authority passed the impugned order dated 5 March 2015 directing payment of ₹2,31,62,800 towards deficit stamp duty.

The petitioners challenged that order, principally contending that proceedings under Section 53A had to be completed within the statutory six-year period.

Whether, under Section 53A(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 as it stood before the 2026 amendment, the six-year period operated only as a limitation for initiating proceedings, or whether the final order determining and recovering deficit stamp duty also had to be passed within that period?

If the six-year period applied only to initiation, whether the final order was nevertheless required to be passed within a reasonable period and, if so, what principle should govern the determination of that period?

Whether the proviso inserted into Section 53A(1) in 2026 is declaratory or substantive, and whether it has any retrospective relevance to proceedings initiated under the unamended provision?

Section 53A(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, as it stood before 2026, empowered the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, “within a period of six years” from the Collector’s certificate, to require production of the instrument, hear the concerned party, examine the instrument and order recovery of deficit duty.

In Sony Mony Electronics Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, Kolte Patil Developers Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, and Romell Real Estate Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, coordinate Single Benches held that the entire Section 53A process, including the final recovery order, had to be completed within six years.

The Court also considered Hariom Agrawal v. Prakash Chand Malviya, where statutory language prohibiting “action” after a specified period restricted the Collector’s adjudicatory power.

Section 32C was relied upon as an example of legislation expressly prescribing separate periods for initiation and completion.

The 2026 proviso to Section 53A(1) now provides that proceedings initiated by notice within six years do not lapse merely because that period expires and may continue until the final order.

Judicial discipline requires a Single Judge disagreeing with a coordinate-Bench decision to refer the issue to a larger Bench rather than take a contrary view.

The Court recognised that the language of the unamended Section 53A(1) supported two possible interpretations.

Under the view adopted in Sony Mony, the words “within a period of six years” governed the entire sequence of statutory acts, including the final recovery order, particularly because the provision linked those acts with the word “and” and did not separately distinguish initiation from completion.

However, the Court considered it equally arguable that the six-year limitation attached only to the Authority’s power to require production of the instrument and thereby initiate proceedings; the subsequent adjudication could then be completed within a reasonable time.

The Court further noted that Section 53A did not expressly state that no recovery order could be passed after six years, nor did it prescribe a two-year completion period as in Section 32C.

The 2026 proviso directly addressed continuation after expiry of six years, while the Supreme Court was considering the correctness of Sony Mony.

Since three coordinate Benches had adopted one interpretation, but that interpretation potentially required reconsideration in light of the amendment, statutory language and pending Supreme Court proceedings, the Single Judge held that judicial propriety required reference to a larger Bench.

It held that the interpretation of Section 53A(1)—whether the six-year period governs only initiation or also requires completion and passing of the final recovery order—raised a substantial question requiring consideration by a larger Bench.

The connected issue concerning completion within a reasonable period and the character and retrospective effect of the 2026 proviso were also directed to be considered.

The Registry was directed to place the papers before the Chief Justice for constitution of an appropriate larger Bench.

The writ petition was kept pending until the reference was decided, after which it was to be taken up for final disposal in accordance with the larger Bench’s ruling.