The Welfare of the Child Justifies Unsupervised Visitation Rights for Non-Custodial Parents Under the Special Marriage Act.

The Petitioner (mother) and Respondent (father) were married in 2015 and have a minor daughter, Amara, born in 2020

Following marital discord and allegations of abuse, the Respondent instituted dissolution proceedings (M.C. No. 2004/2023)

Initially, the Family Court granted the Respondent supervised visitation on alternate Sundays

On March 3, 2025, the court expanded this to unsupervised visitation on the 2nd and 4th Sundays from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.

Upon a review petition (I.A. No. 6) filed by the Petitioner and a concession by the Respondent, the Family Court modified the order on September 27, 2025, restricting unsupervised visitation to two hours (10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.) with pick-up and drop-off at the Petitioner’s residence

The Petitioner challenged this order, seeking to restate the requirement for her presence during visitation

1. Whether the Family Court’s grant of unsupervised visitation rights to the Respondent was arbitrary or contrary to the welfare of the minor child

2. Whether the High Court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to interfere with a discretionary interim order regarding child visitation

Section 38 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, which empowers the court to make interim orders regarding the custody and maintenance of children

The court emphasized the paramountcy of the "welfare of the child" principle, which overrides and informs all custody and visitation disputes

Child Access, Custody and Parenting Plan Guidelines, 2025 (Calcutta High Court), which promote structured visitation and the concept of "shared parenting" to ensure a child maintains meaningful contact with both parents for psychological development

Limits of supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, which restrict interference to cases of perversity or manifest error

The Court observed that the Family Court’s decision was a pragmatic attempt to balance the child’s need for paternal access with the risks of prolonged separation from the primary caregiver

The reduction of visitation time from eight hours to two hours evidenced a "conscious" consideration of the child's tender age (four years) and the Respondent's previous period of absence

The Court rejected the Petitioner's argument that unsupervised access was inherently detrimental, noting that the Respondent had acted bona fide by consenting to the time reduction

It held that at the interlocutory stage, a "roving enquiry" into the Petitioner's allegations of past abuse is not required; rather, the focus must be on maintaining emotional stability for the child

Since the Family Court exercised its discretion grounded in the "welfare of the child" doctrine and the Respondent’s concessions, the order could not be termed perverse or arbitrary

The High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the Family Court’s order dated September 27, 2025

The Petitioner remains at liberty to approach the Family Court for further modifications should any "adverse development" or difficulty in implementation arise while the main petition is pending

No costs were awarded