Transfer-charge amendments cannot apply retrospectively to transfers under pre-amendment leases lacking such conditions.

The petitioners challenged CIDCO’s demand for transfer charges arising from transfers of flats or shares in co-operative housing societies.

Manmandir Co-operative Housing Society and Surya Co-operative Housing Society had entered into agreements to lease and lease deeds before 8 February 1990, when Explanation (iii) was added to Regulation 3(vii) of the New Bombay Disposal of Lands Regulations, 1975.

The Explanation treated transfers of members’ shares, and certain acts enabling enjoyment of the land or building, as transfers of the demised land.

The societies argued that their leases did not impose transfer-charge obligations on individual members.

CIDCO relied on the Regulations and the lease conditions, and objected to the Federation seeking relief for its wider membership without providing society-specific particulars.

The petition sought, among other relief, to quash CIDCO’s demand dated 26 October 2016 against Manmandir Society.

Whether Explanation (iii) to Regulation 3(vii), inserted on 8 February 1990, could be applied to transfers by members of societies whose lease deeds pre-dated the amendment and contained no such transfer-charge obligation.

Whether the Federation and the societies listed in the petition were entitled to a blanket declaration against CIDCO’s demands, absent particulars and examination of their respective lease deeds.

The Court applied Regulation 3(vii) of the New Bombay Disposal of Lands Regulations, 1975, including Explanation (iii), which extended “transfer of the demised land” to specified transfers of shares or acts by members of a company or co-operative housing society.

It relied on the presumption against retrospectivity: legislation imposing a new obligation or disability is ordinarily prospective unless retrospective effect is expressed or follows by necessary implication.

A provision that is genuinely declaratory or clarificatory may operate retrospectively, but the substance and effect of the amendment—not its label—determine its character.

The Court applied CIT-I v. Vatika Township P. Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 1, on fairness and retrospectivity, and Federation of Indian Mineral Industries v. Union of India, (2017) 16 SCC 186, on the prospective operation of delegated legislation and the need for statutory authority to give it retrospective effect.

It also considered Ajay Gupta v. State of Maharashtra, 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 1026, and Jaikumari Amarbahadursingh v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 951, on the non-application of later conditions to earlier allotments or subsisting leases.

The 2008 Amendment Regulations separately prescribed transfer restrictions and charges for apartment owners.

The Court found that the pre-1990 lease deeds restricted assignment by the lessee society but did not impose the later transfer-charge obligation on individual members.

Although CIDCO described Explanation (iii) as clarificatory, the Court held that it introduced a substantive liability by extending the transfer restriction to members’ share transfers and related acts; applying it to earlier leases would therefore impose a new obligation retrospectively.

The later 2008 Regulations expressly addressed transfers by apartment owners, reinforcing the distinction between the earlier lease conditions and subsequent regulation.

However, the Federation had not supplied sufficient details or the relevant lease covenants for its wider membership.

The Court therefore confined relief to Manmandir and Surya Societies, whose lease documents were before it.

It quashed CIDCO’s demand letter dated 26 October 2016 against Manmandir and the corresponding transfer-charge demands against Surya.

Relief was expressly confined to those two societies; no blanket declaration was granted for the Federation’s other member societies or those listed in Exhibits A and B.