Trial court's discretionary power to summon relevant documents under Section 91 CrPC remains independent of Section 65 Evidence Act.

The applicants (warehouse operators) challenged an order dated 14.02.2025 passed by the JMFC, Deori, which allowed an application filed by the respondent under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C.

The dispute involved the alleged storage of soybeans by the respondent’s brother in the applicants' warehouse; the applicants claimed the goods were returned and receipts surrendered, whereas the respondent sought the production of deposit registers and receipts prior to the recording of evidence.

The applicants contended that the respondent lacked locus standi and that the application was a fishing inquiry to fill lacunae in the case.

1. Whether the trial court's order directing the production of documents under Section 91 Cr.P.C. prior to the recording of evidence was legally sustainable or suffered from patent illegality.

2. Whether the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) should be exercised to set aside a discretionary interlocutory order for production of documents.

Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. (corresponding to the relevant provisions of BNSS), which empowers a court to summon any document or thing considered "necessary or desirable" for the purposes of any inquiry or trial.

Principles governing Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 482 Cr.P.C.), which dictates that inherent powers are to be exercised sparingly and only to correct jurisdictional errors, patent illegality, or perversity.

Section 91 is independent of Section 65 of the Evidence Act and operates in a distinct field.

The High Court reasoned that the power under Section 91 Cr.P.C. is a matter of judicial discretion intended to ensure the just decision of a case.

The court found that the documents sought (receipts and registers) were prima facie relevant to determining whether the agricultural produce was stored and returned.

It rejected the applicants' argument regarding the respondent’s lack of locus, holding that such disputes do not preclude the court from summoning material necessary for the truth.

The court further observed that the rejection of a previous application under Section 65 of the Evidence Act does not bar an application under Section 91, as the latter is a discretionary tool for the court to bring relevant material onto the record.

Since the applicants failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error or perversity, the court declined to interfere.

It concluded that there was no ground to exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS as the impugned order did not suffer from any infirmity.

The application was dismissed.