Trial courts may exercise discretionary power to recall witnesses at any trial stage to ensure just decisions.

The petitioner challenged an order dated 04.06.2026 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhanpura in S.T. No. 11/2024.

The trial court had allowed a prosecution application under Section 348 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 [formerly Section 311 CrPC], to recall the father of the prosecutrix and introduce additional electronic evidence (video clips, chats, and mobile data).

The petitioner contended that the application was filed at a belated stage after the conclusion of prosecution evidence and recording of the accused's statement.

He further alleged that the electronic evidence was available prior to the FIR and that the application was a "malafide counterblast" to a pending recovery dispute under Section 138 of the NI Act.

1. Whether the trial court’s discretionary power to recall witnesses and admit additional evidence under Section 348 BNSS is limited by the advanced stage of the trial.

2. Whether the impugned order allowing the recall of a witness and admission of electronic evidence constituted a patent illegality or an improper attempt to fill lacunae in the prosecution's case.

Section 348 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, which is pari materia with Section 311 of the CrPC, grants courts broad discretionary power to summon or recall witnesses "at any stage" if their evidence is essential to a "just decision of the case".

The court relied on V.N. Patil v. K. Niranjan Kumar (2021) to establish that the determinative factor is the necessity of evidence for justice.

The court cited Vijay Kumar v. State of U.P. (2011) and Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI (2019), which mandate that while the power is wide, it must be exercised judicially, with caution, and not to permit the abuse of process.

The court reasoned that the statutory phrase "at any stage" explicitly allows the trial court to exercise its jurisdiction even when a matter is fixed for final arguments.

It found that procedural lapses, delays, or prosecution oversight do not serve as an absolute embargo if the evidence is "essential" to unearthing the truth.

The High Court observed that the trial judge had recorded subjective satisfaction that the evidence was imperative to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

The court dismissed the petitioner's claim of prejudice, noting that the admission of evidence does not equate to a finding of guilt, provided the accused is given a fair opportunity to rebut it.

The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision and the application for stay (I.A. No. 8412/2026), affirming the trial court's order, and directed that the petitioner must be granted a "proper, adequate, and unfettered opportunity" to cross-examine the recalled witness and rebut the newly admitted electronic evidence.