Trial of a Juvenile for Heinous Offences Without Mandatory Preliminary Assessment Under Section 15 JJ Act Vitiates Conviction.

The Appellant was convicted by the Special Court, Kendrapara (Judgment dated 23.04.2025) for kidnapping and repeatedly raping a minor victim, sentenced to 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and various terms under Sections 363, 365, and 366 of the IPC.

The prosecution alleged the victim (born 28.09.2003) was kidnapped on 18.11.2020 and recovered on 14.03.2021.

During the appeal, the Appellant produced a High School Certificate indicating his date of birth as 01.02.2003, establishing that on the date of the offense, he was 17 years, 9 months, and 17 days old.

The appellant contended that the relationship was consensual and that the trial was vitiated due to his status as a juvenile.

Section 2(13) and Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice (JJ) Act, 2015, which define a "child in conflict with law" and mandate a preliminary assessment by the Juvenile Justice Board for children aged 16–18 accused of heinous offenses.

Thirumoorthy v. State of T.N., which held that trials conducted without such assessment are impermissible.

Ajeet Gurjar v. State of M.P., which established that the procedure under Sections 15 and 19 of the JJ Act is mandatory.

Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi) regarding the legislative intent to avoid automatically trying juveniles as adults.

The Court observed that since the Appellant’s verified date of birth was 01.02.2003, he was a minor under Section 2(12) of the JJ Act at the time of the incident.

The Court reasoned that the Special Court committed a fundamental procedural error by proceeding with a regular criminal trial without referring the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board for a preliminary assessment under Section 15.

Applying Thirumoorthy, the Court found that the absence of this assessment stripped the trial court of the jurisdiction to accept the charge-sheet or conduct the trial.

The Court noted the victim’s conflicting statements regarding consent (Section 164 CrPC vs. Trial testimony) and emphasized that child protection jurisprudence aims for reform and reintegration rather than treating adolescents in close-in-age relationships as hardened criminals.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 23.04.2025 were set aside, and the Court quashed the proceedings and acquitted the Appellant of all charges.