TRIBUNAL CANNOT INTERFERE WITH CHARGE SHEET AT NASCENT STAGE OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Prem Shankar Dubey, the applicant, joined the Department of Posts as a Postal Assistant on October 7, 1987, and was scheduled to retire on June 30, 2024.

He was serving as Sub-Postmaster at Daraganj Post Office, Prayagraj, from June 23, 2022.

Approximately ten days before his retirement, on June 20, 2024, he was placed under suspension while on medical leave by the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Prayagraj Division.

A charge sheet was issued to him on June 25, 2024, under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, alleging non-performance of duties, including allowing an unauthorized person, Shri Nikhil Srivastava, to function as an SAS agent and failing to supervise Savings Bank operations, leading to misappropriation.

The applicant maintained that his duties did not include banking work, nor was he provided access to Savings Bank operations, which were performed by an ASPM/Dy. SPM.

He also contended that the post of ASPM/Dy. SPM, which the respondents claimed was unauthorized, was, in fact, a separate supervisory post for banking and other duties at Daraganj Post Office.

After his retirement on June 30, 2024, the disciplinary proceedings were converted under Rule 8 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021.

The applicant sought quashing of the suspension memo and charge sheet, along with payment of retiral benefits.

Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal can quash the suspension memo and charge sheet issued to the applicant at an interlocutory stage of disciplinary proceedings.

Whether the applicant is entitled to the payment of retiral benefits, including leave encashment, gratuity, and CGEIS, with interest, while disciplinary proceedings are pending.

The Tribunal primarily applied the principle of limited judicial review in disciplinary matters as established by the Hon’ble Apex Court.

Specifically, it referenced Union of India vs. Upendra Singh (1994 (3) SCC 357), which stipulates that courts can interfere with charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry only if no misconduct is made out, the charges are contrary to law, or disclose bias, but not to determine the correctness or truth of the charges themselves at a preliminary stage.

Furthermore, it relied on Union of India and Another vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 16572 of 2006), which held that a writ ordinarily does not lie against a charge sheet or show-cause notice as it is premature, does not give rise to a cause of action, and does not infringe upon rights until a final adverse order is passed.

The Tribunal analyzed the applicant's request to quash the suspension memo and charge sheet in light of the established legal principles regarding judicial review in disciplinary proceedings.

It noted that the applicant's contention challenged the merits of the charges laid against him, particularly his involvement in Savings Bank work and the responsibility of the ASPM/Dy. SPM.

However, the court emphasized that it cannot act as an appellate authority and delve into the truth or falsity of the charges framed at a preliminary stage.

Citing Union of India vs. Upendra Singh, the Tribunal affirmed that the determination of the truth of charges falls within the purview of the disciplinary authority.

Additionally, referring to Union of India and Another vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, the Tribunal highlighted that a charge sheet is merely a notice of allegations and does not affect rights until a final order is passed, thus rendering the application premature.

The disciplinary authority has the exclusive role of judging facts, and judicial review at this nascent stage would inappropriately stall ongoing proceedings.

Accordingly, the applicant's Original Application was dismissed.

The Tribunal directed the applicant to participate in the disciplinary proceedings and present his grievances to the Inquiry Officer.

The respondents were directed to complete the proceedings expeditiously.

Liberty was granted to the applicant to approach the Tribunal again if he remained unsatisfied with the final outcome of the proceedings.

No order was made as to costs.