Tribunals cannot reassess disciplinary evidence or substitute punishment absent procedural illegality or shocking disproportionality.

The Applicant, appointed as a Khalasi on compassionate grounds in 1990, was transferred to Erode and later worked as Helper Grade-I.

On 24 November 2012, she allegedly left her assigned workplace, signed the attendance register at another location, refused to return when directed, and abused and threatened a Senior Section Engineer. She was suspended on 28 November 2012 and issued a charge memorandum alleging violation of Rules 3.1(ii) and (iii) of the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966.

The departmental Inquiry Officer found the charges proved. The Disciplinary Authority imposed the major penalty of removal from service on 3 December 2015, and the Appellate Authority confirmed it on 18 March 2016.

In revision, the penalty was modified to reduction to the lower post of C&W Khalasi for five years, with fixed pay, loss of seniority, postponement of increments, and treatment of the intervening period as “dies-non”.

Whether the disciplinary proceedings and the findings that the Applicant violated Rules 3.1(ii) and (iii) of the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966 were vitiated by procedural irregularity, violation of natural justice, mala fides, or lack of evidence?

Whether the penalty imposed and subsequently modified by the Revisional Authority was disproportionate and liable to be interfered with by the Tribunal?

Whether the Applicant was entitled to treatment of the intervening period as duty, consequential monetary benefits, restoration of seniority, and retrospective promotion?

The Tribunal exercised jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

The charge was examined under Rules 3.1(ii) and (iii) of the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966, which require a Railway servant to maintain devotion to duty and conduct becoming of a Railway servant.

Relying on State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557, the Tribunal held that judicial review in disciplinary matters is supervisory, not appellate; interference is permissible only for jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice, violation of prescribed procedure, findings based on no evidence, or conclusions that no reasonable person could reach.

Under B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, the disciplinary and appellate authorities have primary discretion regarding punishment, and a Tribunal may interfere with the penalty only where it shocks the conscience, ordinarily by remitting the matter for reconsideration or, in exceptional cases, modifying the punishment for cogent reasons.

The Tribunal found that the Applicant had been given adequate opportunity to defend herself, including participation in the enquiry, submission of her defence, and representation against the enquiry report; no violation of natural justice or material procedural irregularity was established.

The findings of guilt were supported by the departmental record, and the Applicant’s allegations of union pressure and mala fides were not substantiated.

Applying the limited scope of judicial review, the Tribunal declined to reappreciate the evidence or substitute its own factual conclusions for those of the disciplinary authorities.

As to proportionality, the Tribunal noted that although removal from service had initially been imposed, the Revisional Authority had considered the Applicant’s long service, compassionate appointment and family circumstances and substituted the penalty with reduction to a lower post for five years.

The consequential fixation of pay, loss of seniority, postponement of increments and treatment of the intervening period as “dies-non” were not regarded as arbitrary, illegal or so disproportionate as to warrant interference.

The challenge to the disciplinary, appellate and revisional orders was therefore rejected, and the claims for reinstatement-related benefits, treatment of the intervening period as duty, restoration of seniority, monetary benefits and retrospective promotion were denied.

The Original Application was dismissed as devoid of merit, with no order as to costs.