Two exclusive NIA courts ordered for Tamil Nadu to speed up UAPA trials

On 23.10.2022, a Maruti 800 car was detonated and set ablaze outside Arulmigu Kottai Sangameshwarar Temple, Ukkadam, Coimbatore; the driver, Jamesha Mubeen/A1, died in the explosion.

The appellant, A3, was initially implicated in Crime No. 207 of 2022 under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 3(a) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, and was arrested on 24.10.2022.

The NIA alleged that the appellant, a used-car dealer, purchased the Maruti 800 for ₹21,000 on 20.06.2022 and handed it over to A1 on the same day as logistical support for a terrorist conspiracy.

The charge-sheet, filed on 20.04.2023, alleged offences under Sections 34, 120-B and 153-A IPC, Section 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, and Sections 16, 18, 20, 38 and 39 of the UAPA.

The prosecution relied upon witness testimony regarding the vehicle transaction, the appellant’s alleged participation in a meeting concerning violent acts against “Kafirs” and places of worship, and digital evidence allegedly containing ISIS-related images, videos, messages and material concerning jihadist propaganda.

The appellant contended that the transaction was an ordinary sale in the course of his business and that ideological sympathy or possession of objectionable digital material did not establish a UAPA offence.

His bail application had been rejected twice. The Special Court rejected bail on 05.03.2024, leading to the present appeal under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act read with Section 439 Cr.P.C.

Whether, having regard to Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA, the accusations against the appellant were prima facie true so as to disentitle him from bail?

Whether the appellant’s procurement and supply of the vehicle, considered along with the witness and digital evidence, prima facie constituted participation in a terrorist conspiracy and provision of logistical support under Sections 16, 18, 20, 38 and 39 of the UAPA?

Whether the appellant was entitled to bail on account of prolonged incarceration and the alleged lack of progress in the trial?

The Court applied Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA, under which bail cannot be granted where, upon perusal of the case diary or report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true.

It considered Sections 15 and 16 of the UAPA, defining and penalising a terrorist act; Section 18, concerning conspiracy, attempts or preparatory acts relating to a terrorist act; Section 20, relating to membership of a terrorist gang or organisation; and Sections 38 and 39, concerning association with, and support to, a terrorist organisation.

The appeal jurisdiction arose under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act read with Section 439 Cr.P.C.

The Court distinguished National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India, Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, and Ammar Abdul Rahiman v. National Investigation Agency, applying the principle that, at the bail stage under Section 43-D(5), the Court must assess whether the accusations are prima facie true, without conducting a detailed appreciation of evidence.

The Court held that the vehicle transaction, standing alone, might have been consistent with the appellant’s ordinary business; however, the surrounding circumstances prima facie connected him with the conspiracy.

Multiple witnesses spoke not merely to the sale but to the presence of the appellant and other accused during the transaction and to the subsequent loading of explosive substances and gas cylinders into the vehicle.

The protected witness, L.W.99, alleged that the appellant and A1 had discussed a plan to carry out violence against non-believers and their places of worship.

This account was prima facie corroborated by a message from A1 to the appellant stating “In Kabrsthan” on the date of the alleged meeting.

Digital evidence allegedly showed ISIS flags, images of the vehicle used in the blast, communications concerning its purchase, and jihadist propaganda material.

On a holistic assessment, the Court found reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant was not wholly unaware of the conspiracy and had provided logistical support for the terrorist act.

Although there was no material establishing that he was a member of a proscribed terrorist organisation for the purpose of Section 38, the alleged supply of the vehicle constituted prima facie support under Section 39.

The Court therefore concluded that the accusations were prima facie true within the meaning of Section 43-D(5).

The appellant’s prolonged incarceration and the delay in trial did not justify bail in view of the incriminating material, although the Court directed that the pace of NIA/UAPA trials be substantially improved.

The Court held that the prosecution material—including witness testimony, the alleged meeting, the same-day transfer of the vehicle, and digital evidence—established a prima facie case of the appellant’s participation in the terrorist conspiracy and provision of logistical support; hence, the bar under Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA applied and bail was refused.

The Court clarified that its observations were confined to the bail determination and would not affect the trial.

Separately, noting the pendency of 39 matters before the Poonamallee Special Court, the Court suo motu impleaded the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and the State Government’s Home Department and directed steps toward constitution of two exclusive Special Courts for UAPA/NIA matters in Tamil Nadu, with compliance to be reported on 24.09.2026.