Unchallenged school admission-register entries sufficiently establish a victim’s minority under POCSO.

The appellant was prosecuted for repeatedly committing aggravated penetrative sexual assault upon PW1, a minor girl, over approximately seven to eight months in 2015.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant lured PW1 to a residence, sexually assaulted her, photographed her in a nude or semi-nude condition, and threatened to publish the photographs and harm her siblings if she disclosed the incidents.

The FIR was registered on 20.11.2015 on the basis of PW1’s statement.

The trial court framed a charge under Section 5(l) read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”), convicted the appellant, and sentenced him to 12 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹10,000, with two months’ simple imprisonment in default.

The appellant challenged the conviction on the grounds that PW1’s minority, the place of occurrence, the delay in reporting, the identity of the person in the photographs, and the recovery and chain of custody of the mobile phone had not been proved.

He also sought reduction of the sentence to the statutory minimum applicable in 2015.

Whether the prosecution proved that PW1 was below 18 years of age on the date of the occurrence, so as to attract the POCSO Act.

Whether the testimony of PW1, supported by the evidence of PW2 and PW8, established repeated aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Section 5(l) of the POCSO Act.

Whether the photographs found in the mobile phone recovered from the appellant depicted PW1 and whether the recovery and chain of custody of the phone were proved.

Whether the delay in lodging the FIR and the alleged inconsistency regarding the place of occurrence created reasonable doubt about the prosecution case.

Whether the sentence of 12 years’ rigorous imprisonment required reduction to the minimum sentence of 10 years applicable before the 2019 amendment to Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The Court applied Sections 5(l) and 6 of the POCSO Act, under which repeated penetrative sexual assault on a child constitutes aggravated penetrative sexual assault punishable, at the time of the offence, with rigorous imprisonment of not less than ten years and up to life imprisonment, along with fine.

It applied Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, holding that testimony based on an investigating officer’s direct perception of images is admissible as direct oral evidence.

The Court treated the school admission register as admissible documentary evidence of age, while holding that the principal’s certificate prepared during investigation was inadmissible as a statement under Section 161 CrPC.

It further held that non-compliance with Section 232 CrPC does not automatically vitiate a trial absent demonstrated prejudice, relying on Moidu K. v. State of Kerala.

The Court relied on the settled principle that the credible testimony of a prosecutrix can sustain a conviction, particularly where materially corroborated, and that delay in reporting a sexual offence is not fatal when reasonably explained by fear, threats, or trauma.

The Court found PW1’s account consistent across her FIR, statement under Section 164 CrPC, and trial testimony regarding the appellant’s inducement, confinement, repeated sexual assaults, threats, and use of photographs to silence her.

PW2 corroborated PW1’s disclosure after the Bhai Dooj incident, while PW8 corroborated the appellant’s presence at the house and his threats with a knife.

The admission register recorded PW1’s date of birth as 04.02.2001, making her 14 years old on 20.11.2015; the defence did not challenge the authenticity of the register entries.

The Court held that the appellant’s representation that PW1’s friend had called her reasonably explained PW1’s presence at the residence, and that the defence had not shown that PW1 knew the friend lived elsewhere.

The delay in reporting was explained by the appellant’s threats to publish nude photographs and harm PW1’s siblings, a fear corroborated by the recovery of such photographs from the appellant’s phone.

The Court accepted the IO’s direct identification of PW1 in the photographs under Section 60 of the Evidence Act, which was independently supported by the FSL report identifying the photographed female and PW1 as the same person and finding no manipulation.

Recovery was proved through PW5 and PW12, while the malkhana records, dispatch evidence, intact seals, and FSL report established an unbroken chain of custody.

Although the offence predated the 2019 amendment and the applicable minimum sentence was ten years, the Court declined to reduce the 12-year sentence because of the gravity of the offence and the appellant’s prolonged abscondence after obtaining interim bail.

The conviction under Section 5(l) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act was affirmed.

The Court also upheld the sentence of 12 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹10,000, with two months’ simple imprisonment in default, finding no exceptional circumstance warranting reduction to the statutory minimum.

The appeal was dismissed and any pending applications were closed.