Unconditional release under Section 110(2) cannot be ordered where issuance of oral Section 124(a) notice is disputed.

The Petitioner arrived at Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi, from Saudi Arabia on 19.12.2023 and was intercepted after crossing the Green Channel.

Customs issued a Detention Receipt for one 100-gram gold bar marked “100 grams fine gold 999.9,” citing a “Green Channel Violation”.

On the same date, her statement was recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, in which she admitted the alleged omission and commission, agreed to the departmental valuation, expressed willingness to pay duty, fine and penalty, and stated that she did not require a show-cause notice or personal hearing.

The Respondent’s records separately stated that an oral show-cause notice under the first proviso to Section 124 had been issued on 19.12.2023, although no Order-in-Original had been passed.

The Petitioner sought unconditional release of the gold under Section 110(2), contending that no written show-cause notice had been issued within the statutory period and disputing the voluntariness and contents of her statement.

Whether the Petitioner was entitled to unconditional release of the seized gold under Section 110(2) on the ground that no written show-cause notice was issued within the prescribed period.

Whether the Respondent’s assertion that an oral show-cause notice was issued under the first proviso to Section 124 on 19.12.2023 raised disputed factual questions incapable of conclusive determination in writ proceedings.

Whether the Petitioner’s alleged waiver of a show-cause notice and personal hearing, by itself, constituted compliance with Section 124(a).

Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 mandates the return of seized goods where no notice under Section 124(a) is issued within six months of seizure, subject to a valid statutory extension of time.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. Jatin Ahuja, Civil Appeal No. 3489/2024, decided on 11.09.2025, establishes that the Section 110(2) time-limit is mandatory and that the statutory consequence of return follows where the requisite Section 124(a) notice is not issued within the prescribed or duly extended period; Sections 110(2) and 124 operate in distinct fields.

Under the first proviso to Section 124, the notice under clause (a) and the representation under clause (b) may be oral at the request of the person concerned.

The Court distinguished Ms. Shubhangi Gupta v. Commissioner of Customs, W.P.(C) 10772/2024, where the Revenue had relied only on waiver and had not asserted that an oral notice was actually issued.

The Court accepted that Section 110(2) operates mandatorily where a Section 124(a) notice has not been issued within the statutory period.

However, the Petitioner’s case rested on the alleged complete absence of notice, whereas the Respondent specifically asserted and recorded that an oral show-cause notice had been issued on the date of seizure.

The Petitioner’s contemporaneous Section 108 statement—recording admissions, willingness to pay duty, fine and penalty, and non-requirement of notice and hearing—supported the existence of a disputed factual foundation, although the Court held that the statement alone could not automatically constitute an oral show-cause notice.

The allegations that the statement was pre-prepared, unexplained, coerced, or improperly obtained, together with the Respondent’s reliance on the contemporaneous record, required evidentiary examination and could not be conclusively resolved in Article 226 proceedings.

Accordingly, the absence of a written notice did not, by itself, establish non-compliance with Section 124(a), and Jatin Ahuja did not eliminate the need to determine whether an oral notice had in fact been issued.

Since the Respondent specifically asserted that an oral show-cause notice had been issued on 19.12.2023, and the validity, content and circumstances of that alleged notice involved disputed questions of fact, no writ of mandamus could be issued.

The Petition was dismissed, without any determination on the Petitioner’s ultimate liability, confiscability of the gold, or the evidentiary value of her Section 108 statement.