Uncorroborated Testimony Of Child Victim Inspires Confidence Supporting Conviction Despite Delay In Lodging FIR

The appellant, a school van driver, was accused of diverting the vehicle on 21.10.2016 while transporting a 12-year-old victim (Class-VII) home. He allegedly confined her near a temple and sexually assaulted her by touching her inappropriately.

An FIR was lodged on 03.11.2016 after a 13-day delay, during which the appellant allegedly intimidated the victim’s family.

The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 342 and 354-A of the IPC, Section 8 of the POCSO Act, and Section 3(1)(w)(i) of the SC & ST (PoA) Act, sentencing him to five years of rigorous imprisonment.

The appellant challenged the conviction primarily on the grounds of unexplained delay in the FIR, lack of medical corroboration, and child witness inconsistencies.

1. Whether the 13-day delay in lodging the FIR and the lack of initial disclosure by the victim to school authorities are fatal to the prosecution's case

2. Whether the testimony of a child victim can form the sole basis of conviction in the absence of medical corroboration and forensic evidence

3. Whether the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act were correctly invoked against the appellant

The Court applied Section 8 of the POCSO Act (punishment for sexual assault) and Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act regarding the presumption of guilt once foundational facts are established.

It relied on State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, holding that courts must adopt a sensitive approach in sexual assault cases and not be swayed by minor contradictions.

It further applied the "sterling witness" test from Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), requiring the witness's version to be of high quality and unassailable.

The court also noted that delay in FIRs for sexual offences is not viewed with the same rigidity as other crimes, per Harpal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh.

The Court found the victim’s testimony (PW-1) to be consistent on material particulars, including the identity of the accused and the nature of the assault, qualifying her as a "sterling witness".

The Court reasoned that initial silence or denial by a child victim is common due to trauma or fear of the accused, who in this case had allegedly threatened the family.

Regarding medical evidence, the Court held that since the charge was sexual assault (touching) and not penetrative assault, the absence of physical injuries or hymenal tears did not contradict the ocular testimony.

The Court determined that once the prosecution proved the foundational facts of the encounter, the burden shifted to the accused under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, which the appellant failed to rebut beyond mere suggestions of personal enmity.

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and five-year sentence, affirming that defects in investigation (like failure to seize clothing) and delay in FIR are not fatal when the victim’s testimony is of "sterling quality" and inspires judicial confidence.