Undecided timely Section 33 requests may constitute sufficient cause for condoning Section 34 delay.

An arbitral award was rendered on 11 December 2025 and served on the parties on 12 December 2025.

The judgment-debtors first sought interpretation of aspects of the award under Section 33(1)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) on 15 December 2025 and formally filed the request on 8 January 2026.

The arbitral tribunal did not consider or dispose of the Section 33 request.

The three-month limitation period under Section 34(3) expired on 11 March 2026.

After the decree-holder initiated enforcement proceedings on 18 March 2026, the judgment-debtors raised a preliminary objection based on the pending Section 33 request; that objection was rejected by the High Court on 20 March 2026.

The judgment-debtors challenged that order before the Supreme Court and filed the Section 34 petition on 8 April 2026, with an application seeking condonation of a 27-day delay.

The Supreme Court left the maintainability and condonation issues open for independent determination by the High Court.

Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 prescribes a three-month limitation period for filing an application to set aside an arbitral award, calculated from receipt of the award, and permits the court to condone delay only for a further period of thirty days if sufficient cause is shown.

Section 33(1) permits a party to request correction, interpretation or an additional award in the circumstances specified therein, while Section 33(2) requires the tribunal to consider such a request within thirty days of receipt.

In Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gaurav, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1811, the Supreme Court held that where a Section 33 request is made within thirty days of receipt of the award and with notice to the other party, limitation under Section 34(3) commences from disposal of that request, irrespective of its outcome.

The court also applied the principle that Section 34(3) must be construed strictly in light of the Arbitration Act’s objective of expeditious and time-bound resolution, while recognising that a delay within the additional thirty-day period may be condoned where sufficient cause is established.

The court held that the question was not whether limitation should be computed from disposal of the Section 33 request, but whether the circumstances explained a 27-day delay within the statutorily condonable period.

Although the decree-holder disputed the maintainability of the Section 33(1)(b) request for want of consent, the request had been made within the prescribed period, communicated to the opposing party, and remained undecided by the tribunal.

The judgment-debtors pursued the issue in the enforcement proceedings, challenged the High Court’s adverse order before the Supreme Court, and filed the Section 34 petition within eighteen days of that order.

These steps demonstrated bona fide pursuit of available remedies rather than negligence or a dilatory tactic.

The tribunal’s statutory obligation under Section 33(2) to consider the request within thirty days also supported the judgment-debtors’ explanation, although the court expressly declined to decide the request’s ultimate maintainability for purposes of condonation.

The authorities relied upon by the decree-holder were distinguished because they involved unexplained departmental delay, voluminous records, delays exceeding the permissible period, or applications under Section 33 filed outside the prescribed time.

The delay-condonation application under Section 34(3) was allowed, and the delay was condoned.

The court did not finally determine the maintainability of the Section 33(1)(b) request.

The Section 34 petition and connected applications were directed to be listed with the enforcement petition on 28 September 2026.