Under Section 19(iii) HMA, jurisdiction lies only where the parties last resided together.

The appellant-wife filed a divorce petition under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA), alleging cruelty by her husband. The parties married at Gurugram on 18 January 2019 and initially resided together at Sangam Vihar, Delhi, for approximately one-and-a-half to two years. They thereafter shifted to rented accommodation at Gurugram, where they resided together for more than four years until shortly before the filing of the divorce petition. The wife alleged that the husband subsequently expelled her from the matrimonial home and that she began residing separately with the children

The Family Court returned the divorce petition under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, holding that Delhi lacked territorial jurisdiction because the parties had last resided together at Gurugram. The wife challenged that order under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, contending that their earlier residence at Sangam Vihar was sufficient to confer jurisdiction under Section 19(iii) HMA

The High Court also noted that the appeal was improperly instituted against the State of NCT of Delhi, while the husband—the opposite party in the divorce proceedings—had not been impleaded

Whether the appeal was maintainable when it was filed against the State of NCT of Delhi and the respondent-husband was not impleaded as a party?

Whether, under Section 19(iii) of the HMA, the Family Court at Delhi had territorial jurisdiction merely because the parties had earlier resided together at Sangam Vihar, notwithstanding that they subsequently last resided together at Gurugram?

The Court applied Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, particularly Section 19(iii), which permits presentation of a matrimonial petition before the district court within whose jurisdiction “the parties to the marriage last resided together”.

The statutory reference to the place where the parties “last resided together” makes their final place of joint residence, rather than any earlier place of residence, determinative of territorial jurisdiction.

The Court also considered Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, governing appeals from Family Court orders, and Order VII Rule 10 CPC, under which a plaint or petition filed before a court lacking territorial jurisdiction may be returned for presentation before the proper court.

The authorities cited by the appellant—Renu Vij v. Surinder Kumar, Balvinder Kaur v. Mukul Kumar Srivastava, and Vijay Singh v. Chanchal Chaudhary—did not establish that every earlier place of joint residence confers jurisdiction irrespective of a subsequent residence.

The Court first held that the appeal suffered from a fundamental defect in its array of parties because it challenged an order arising from matrimonial proceedings between the wife and the husband, yet named the State of NCT of Delhi as the respondent and omitted the husband.

Nevertheless, it examined the matter on merits. On the appellant’s own pleadings, the parties lived together at Sangam Vihar only during the initial one-and-a-half to two years of the marriage and thereafter shifted to Gurugram, where they lived together for more than four years until shortly before the petition was filed.

Applying the plain language of Section 19(iii) HMA, the Court held that the legally relevant residence was Gurugram because it was the last place where the parties resided together.

Their earlier residence at Sangam Vihar, although substantial and non-transient, could not satisfy the statutory requirement once the parties had subsequently resided together at Gurugram.

The appellant’s reliance on the cited precedents was therefore misplaced.

It held that the appeal was improperly constituted because the husband had not been impleaded, and that the Delhi Family Court lacked territorial jurisdiction under Section 19(iii) HMA since the parties had last resided together at Gurugram, not Sangam Vihar.

The Family Court’s order returning the divorce petition for presentation before the appropriate court was consequently upheld. Pending applications, if any, were also disposed of.