Under Section 9, the burden of proving citizenship remains on the proceedee throughout.

A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (Border), Morigaon, against the petitioner before Foreigners Tribunal No. 1, Morigaon, in F.T. (C) No. 503/2008.

The petitioner filed her written statement on 26 October 2018, produced documentary evidence, and examined two witnesses to establish that she was an Indian citizen.

The Foreigners Tribunal, by opinion dated 16 July 2019, held that she had failed to discharge the burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, and declared her to be a foreigner who had entered India after 25 March 1971.

The petitioner relied upon a school transfer certificate, a Gaon Burah certificate, voter identity documents, electoral rolls from 1965 to 2005, a Jamabandi, and oral evidence, including that of her projected brother.

The respondents contended that the petitioner had not established a reliable documentary link with her projected father and that the certificates relied upon had not been duly proved.

Whether the petitioner discharged the burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, of proving that she was not a foreigner and established her linkage with her projected father?

Whether the Foreigners Tribunal committed an error warranting interference under the High Court’s certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution?

Whether the matter ought to be remanded to enable the petitioner to prove the school certificate and Gaon Burah certificate through their respective issuing authorities?

The Court primarily applied Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, under which the burden of proving that a person is not a foreigner lies upon that person, notwithstanding the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Relying on Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665, and Fateh Mohd. v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1963 SC 1035, the Court held that the proceedee must establish material facts concerning citizenship, including date and place of birth, parentage, and the relevant citizenship particulars of the parents.

The Court further applied the limited scope of certiorari: under Article 226, the High Court does not reweigh evidence or act as an appellate court, but may interfere for jurisdictional error, an error of law apparent on the face of the record, procedural illegality, or reliance on legally impermissible evidence.

The Court also applied the principle that documentary evidence must be duly proved both as to its authenticity and the truth of its contents, as recognised in Romila Khatun v. Union of India, 2018 (4) GLT 373, and Rupajan Begum v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 579.

It further relied on Bijoy Das v. Union of India, 2018 (3) GLT 118, for the proposition that oral evidence alone is insufficient to establish citizenship without corroborating documentary and contemporaneous records.

The Court held that the petitioner’s written statement was vague and did not adequately disclose the particulars necessary to establish citizenship, including her date and place of birth and the relevant details of her parents.

The school certificate was issued in 2018, long after the petitioner allegedly left school in 1992, without any satisfactory explanation for the delay, and it was not proved by school authorities. The Gaon Burah certificate was likewise not proved by its issuing authority.

The electoral rolls containing the name of the projected father, Moniruddin, did not establish the petitioner’s linkage with him; the relevant electoral records for the period 1970–1985 were absent, and the 1985 roll referred to a different village.

The 1997 electoral roll containing the petitioner’s name with her husband did not contain sufficient parental or sibling particulars to establish the claimed lineage.

The testimony of the projected brother could not, by itself, prove citizenship, particularly since no documentary link connected him either with the petitioner or with the projected father.

The Tribunal had considered, rather than ignored, the two disputed certificates; therefore, the case did not warrant remand.

The Court also found the Tribunal’s observation regarding the considerable age difference between the petitioner’s projected parents to be a reasonable factual conclusion not amenable to correction in certiorari jurisdiction.

The Tribunal’s opinion dated 16 July 2019 declaring her a foreigner post 25 March 1971 disclosed no jurisdictional error, procedural illegality, or error of law warranting interference under Article 226.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed, the interim order was vacated, and consequential action was directed to follow in accordance with law.

The Tribunal records were directed to be returned.