Unexplained delay in FIR and inconsistent time gap negate "last seen" theory and Section 106 presumption.

The informant, Shiv Bhajan Yadav (PW 13), alleged that on 29.01.1994, Appellant No. 3 (Bullu Yadav) took his son, Subhash Yadav, away on a bicycle

The informant lodged a missing person report four days later on 03.02.1994

On 04.02.1994, a highly decomposed body was recovered from a river, which the informant identified as his son

On 06.02.1994, Bullu Yadav allegedly made an extra-judicial confession before the Mukhiya (PW 11) and villagers, leading to the recovery of a knife from his house

The Trial Court convicted the appellants under Sections 302, 120B, and 201 IPC, and Appellant No. 3 under Section 364 IPC, sentencing them to life imprisonment

1. Whether the "last seen theory" was sufficient to convict the appellants given the five-day time gap and delay in FIR

2. Whether the identification of the highly decomposed body was reliable

3. Whether the extra-judicial confession and subsequent recovery of the weapon were admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act

The Court applied Section 302 (Murder), 120B (Conspiracy), 201 (Disappearance of evidence), and 364 (Kidnapping) of the IPC

Regarding evidence, it applied Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, which provides that only information "distinctly" leading to the discovery of a fact while the accused is in police custody is admissible

It relied on Perumal Raja v. State (2024) to emphasize that "police custody" is a prerequisite for Section 27

Under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the court applied the "special knowledge" doctrine, noting its limitations when the time gap between "last seen" and death is significant, as established in Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P. (2006) and State of U.P. v. Satish (2005)

Furthermore, it applied the principles from Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) regarding the fatal nature of unexplained delay in lodging an FIR

The Court found that while the "last seen" theory was partially established, the five-day gap between the victim going missing and the body's recovery, coupled with a four-day delay in filing the FIR, broke the chain of circumstantial evidence

The medical evidence (PW 12) contradicted the prosecution, stating death likely occurred before 25.01.1994, prior to the date the boy was allegedly taken

The Court doubted the identification of the body, as it was fully decomposed and no identifying articles were seized

Critically, the extra-judicial confession and recovery of the knife were deemed unreliable because the accused was not in police custody at the time of the statement, failing the mandate of Section 27 of the Evidence Act

Additionally, the weapon was never sent for chemical examination to link it to the crime

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of conviction dated 08.02.1996 and the order of sentence dated 13.02.1996, and acquitted all appellants of all charges. The appellants were ordered to be released forthwith and their bail bonds discharged