Unexplained prolonged delay cannot be condoned merely because counsel failed to communicate the confiscation order.

The applicant’s Tata Sumo vehicle, bearing registration No. MP-15-A-3806, was seized in connection with Crime No. 317/2007 registered under Sections 34(1) and 34(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act.

Although the criminal case subsequently resulted in the applicant’s acquittal on 12 January 2017, independent confiscation proceedings culminated in an order dated 4 August 2011 passed by the Collector (Excise), Sagar, confiscating the vehicle.

The applicant filed an appeal against the confiscation order after approximately seven years, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The Additional Commissioner, Excise, rejected the application for condonation of delay and dismissed the appeal as time-barred on 9 January 2019.

The applicant’s criminal revision was similarly dismissed by the Sixth Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar, on 29 August 2019.

The applicant thereafter invoked the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., contending that the delay occurred because his counsel had not informed him of the confiscation order.

The respondents stated that the vehicle had already been auctioned in January 2012 after expiry of the limitation period.

Whether the applicant had shown sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the approximately seven-year delay in filing the appeal against the confiscation order dated 4 August 2011?

Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to interfere with the concurrent orders refusing to condone the delay and dismissing the appeal and revision as time-barred?

Whether the applicant’s subsequent acquittal in the criminal case constituted sufficient cause for reopening or challenging the concluded confiscation proceedings after the expiry of limitation?

The Court applied Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which permits the High Court to exercise inherent powers to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, but does not ordinarily permit substitution of the Court’s discretion in limitation matters absent manifest illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires an applicant to establish “sufficient cause” for the entire period of delay; although the expression may receive a liberal and justice-oriented interpretation, an extraordinary delay cannot be condoned without a satisfactory and supported explanation.

The Court considered Rafiq v. Munshilal, AIR 1981 SC 1400, for the principle that a litigant should not ordinarily suffer for the bona fide lapse of counsel, but held that the principle cannot dispense with the requirement of explaining prolonged inaction.

It further relied on Ramendra Pal Singh v. State of M.P., (2013) 2 MPLJ 226, and State of M.P. v. Uday Singh, (2020) 12 SCC 733, for the proposition that confiscation proceedings under the Excise law are independent of the criminal prosecution and that a subsequent acquittal does not automatically reopen concluded confiscation proceedings.

The Court held that the applicant had not satisfactorily explained the entire period of approximately seven years between the confiscation order and the filing of the appeal.

The explanation that counsel had failed to communicate the order was the same explanation rejected by both subordinate authorities and was unsupported by any affidavit or convincing material.

Even assuming a bona fide lapse by counsel, the applicant failed to explain why he remained inactive or did not make enquiries concerning the seized vehicle and confiscation proceedings.

Accordingly, Rafiq did not assist him because it could not justify dispensing with the requirement of due diligence in the face of extraordinary delay.

The applicant’s acquittal in the criminal case also did not constitute sufficient cause, since the confiscation proceedings were legally distinct and the vehicle had reportedly been auctioned in January 2012 after expiry of the challenge period.

As the revisional Court had considered the relevant circumstances and its decision disclosed neither perversity nor jurisdictional error, no interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was warranted.

It held that the applicant failed to establish sufficient cause for condoning the approximately seven-year delay and that his subsequent acquittal did not reopen the independent confiscation proceedings.

Finding no manifest illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error in the orders below, the Court dismissed the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and upheld the order dated 29 August 2019 dismissing the criminal revision as time-barred, as well as the order dated 9 January 2019 dismissing the appeal against confiscation.

The Court clarified that it had not examined the legality of the original confiscation order on merits and that its decision was confined to limitation and refusal to condone delay.