Unexplained six-year delay in challenging dismissal for non-prosecution cannot be condoned merely citing COVID-19.

The petitioner had instituted a maintenance petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against his parents, claiming that he was incapable of earning his livelihood.

The petition was dismissed for want of prosecution by the Family Court, Shimla, on 20 November 2019, as neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared and no evidence was produced.

The petitioner thereafter filed a criminal miscellaneous petition seeking restoration of the maintenance proceedings and challenged the dismissal order.

The petition was accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, which was reported to be 6 years, 8 months and 13 days.

On 7 August 2026, the High Court directed the petitioner to place on record a disability certificate or other material establishing his incapacity to earn, since he was claiming maintenance from his parents on that basis.

The petitioner did not comply with that direction.

Whether the petitioner had shown sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of a delay of 6 years, 8 months and 13 days in challenging the dismissal of his maintenance petition?

Whether the COVID-19 pandemic, delay in obtaining legal aid, and non-availability of the certified copy constituted sufficient justification for the prolonged delay?

Whether the petitioner had prima facie established the incapacity to earn necessary for claiming maintenance from his parents under Section 125(1)(c) CrPC?

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, under which delay may be condoned only upon the applicant demonstrating sufficient cause for not approaching the Court within the prescribed period.

The Court also considered the petitioner’s substantive claim under Section 125(1)(c) CrPC, corresponding to Section 144(1)(c) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which permits maintenance to a major child unable to maintain himself or herself because of physical or mental abnormality or injury.

The Court relied on the principle that a prolonged and inadequately explained delay cannot ordinarily be condoned where valuable rights have crystallised in favour of the opposite parties after expiry of limitation.

It further took judicial notice that courts continued functioning until approximately 20 March 2020, and therefore the entire delay could not be attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court found that the petitioner failed to provide a convincing explanation for the extraordinary delay.

The dismissal occurred on 20 November 2019, before the COVID-19-related court closures, and the courts were functioning until about 20 March 2020; consequently, the pandemic could not explain the substantial period of inaction preceding and following that date.

Although legal aid had allegedly been provided in 2022, the petitioner still did not promptly pursue the matter.

He applied for the certified copy only on 24 May 2025, which demonstrated that he had taken no steps to obtain or otherwise secure the impugned order for several years.

The petitioner also failed to comply with the Court’s direction to produce material showing that he was incapable of earning, despite relying on such incapacity as the basis for seeking maintenance from his parents.

In these circumstances, the Court held that sufficient cause under Section 5 had not been established and that the prolonged delay could not be condoned, particularly when rights had crystallised in favour of the aged parent-respondents.

Consequently, the connected petition seeking quashing of the Family Court’s order dated 20 November 2019 and restoration of the maintenance proceedings was also dismissed.

The Court additionally noted the petitioner’s failure to establish prima facie incapacity to earn and appreciated the assistance rendered by the Legal Aid Counsel.