University Vice Chancellor directed to decide the professor-in-charge dispute considering the committee’s seniority finding.

The petitioner, appointed as Lecturer on 30 April 1984, challenged Memo No. C/299/Estab/2025 dated 1 March 2025, by which respondent no. 5, Shri Bhim Singh, was treated as Professor-in-Charge of Ishwar Dayal Bhagwat Prasad Singh College, despite allegedly being junior to the petitioner, who claimed to have obtained a Ph.D. in 1991.

The University constituted a three-member committee through Letter No. C/1191/Estab/2025 dated 2 August 2025. The committee concluded that the petitioner was senior to respondent no. 5 both in terms of date of appointment and acquisition of the Ph.D., and found the petitioner’s claim of seniority supported by the records.

Despite the committee’s report and repeated communications from the Registrar directing consideration and implementation of the report, no effective action was taken by the College authorities.

The petitioner subsequently sought amendment of the writ petition to seek implementation of the committee’s decision and dissolution of the governing body under Section 28 of Statute 32.

The University objected to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that a statutory appellate remedy was available and stated that a related matter concerning removal from the post of Principal was pending before the State Appellate Authority in Appeal No. 11 of 2025.

Whether the writ petition should be entertained despite the availability of a statutory remedy before the Appellate Authority?

Whether the University should be directed to act upon the three-member committee’s finding that the petitioner was senior to respondent no. 5 for determining the Professor-in-Charge of the College?

Whether the petitioner was entitled, at this stage, to a direction for dissolution of the governing body under Section 28 of Statute 32?

The Court applied the principle that the existence of an alternative statutory remedy ordinarily weighs against the exercise of writ jurisdiction, while recognising that the High Court may nevertheless issue appropriate directions where the circumstances justify intervention.

It also considered the seniority principle relied upon by the petitioner, namely that a teacher who acquired a Ph.D. earlier would rank senior in law, as stated by the Division Bench in LPA No. 774 of 2024.

The Court further relied upon the University’s own three-member committee report, which found the petitioner senior on the basis of both appointment date and Ph.D. qualification.

Section 28 of Statute 32 was invoked by the petitioner as the basis for seeking dissolution of the governing body, although the Court did not grant that relief at this stage.

Although the Court acknowledged that the petitioner had an alternative statutory remedy, it considered the University’s subsequent conduct significant.

The University itself had constituted a committee to examine the dispute, and that committee had found, on the basis of the records, that the petitioner was senior to respondent no. 5.

The University thereafter repeatedly addressed communications to the College seeking implementation of the committee’s findings, but the dispute remained unresolved.

In these circumstances, rather than deciding the petitioner’s entitlement to appointment directly or granting the prayer for dissolution of the governing body, the Court directed the Vice Chancellor to take an appropriate decision in light of the committee report and bring the dispute to an end.

The Court therefore adopted a limited supervisory approach while leaving the final administrative decision to the University.

The Court did not itself appoint the petitioner as Professor-in-Charge and did not grant the requested dissolution of the governing body.

The petition was accordingly disposed of without further relief.