Unregistered compromise decree declaring pre-existing rights in suit properties does not require compulsory registration.

The suit properties originally belonged to Kanniappa Naicker, who died in 1940. His wife, Ellammal (died 1955), executed a settlement deed in 1940 in favour of her brother, Subramania Naicker (predecessor of the Plaintiffs/Appellants).

The Plaintiffs claimed title via succession and adverse possession.

The Defendant/Respondent contended that Ellammal was a limited estate holder and that his predecessors (Elumalai and Pachiappa Naicker) were the rightful reversioners.

Crucially, a prior suit (O.S. No. 662 of 1962) involving the same parties/predecessors ended in a compromise decree (Ex-B.6) in 1964, where the Plaintiffs’ predecessors surrendered their claim to the current suit items.

The Trial Court and First Appellate Court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ suit for injunction, prompting this Second Appeal.

1. Whether the principle of res judicata applies based on the compromise decree dated 22.01.1964, despite the appellant claiming he did not sign the compromise memo?

2. Whether the appellant is entitled to a suit for bare injunction to protect possession?

3. Whether the compromise memo dated 22.01.1964 is invalid due to the alleged lack of signatures from the minor plaintiff's guardian and the 2nd plaintiff?

The Court primarily applied Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908, which exempts court decrees from compulsory registration unless they comprise immovable property outside the subject matter of the suit.

The Court relied on the Supreme Court precedents in Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh (1995) and Ripudaman Singh v. Tikka Maheshwar Chand (2021), establishing that a compromise decree reflecting a "pre-existing right" (such as reversionary rights) does not require registration.

The principle that a compromise decree cannot be challenged in a separate suit but must be reopened in the same proceeding under Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC.

The principles from Govindammal v. R. Perumal Chettiar (2006) and Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjith Kaur (2019), requiring proof of animus possidendi for adverse possession.

The Court found that the Plaintiffs’ predecessors (including the first plaintiff, then a minor represented by his brother) were parties to the 1964 compromise decree (Ex-B.6), which admitted the Respondent's predecessors as reversioners.

The Court rejected the argument that the decree was invalid for lack of registration, noting that because the decree dealt with the suit property itself and recognized pre-existing reversionary rights, registration was optional under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act.

The Plaintiffs failed to prove continuous possession as of the date of the suit, as their revenue evidence (Adangal and Kist) only covered the period up to 1983, whereas the Defendant produced a 1982 Sale Deed (Ex-B.8) and a 1988 Patta (Ex-B.1).

The plea of adverse possession failed because the Plaintiffs did not admit the Defendant's title nor prove hostile animus; their possession was deemed at best permissive.

The Court answered the issues stating that while a suit for injunction is maintainable, the relief cannot be granted as the Defendant proved lawful possession and title whereas the Plaintiffs failed to prove possession on the date of the suit.

The High Court dismissed the Second Appeal and confirmed the judgments of the lower courts without order as to costs.