Vague, omnibus allegations and proceedings initiated after a final divorce decree constitute an abuse of process.

The Petitioner No. 1 (husband) and Respondent/Complainant married on 25.01.2005.

The Respondent stayed at the matrimonial home in Ranikhet for only brief intervals (six days in Jan 2005; one week in June 2005) before moving to her parental home in Delhi due to adjustment issues.

After several years of separation, the Petitioner No. 1 obtained an ex-parte decree of divorce from a court in Almora on 05.09.2012.

Subsequently, the Respondent filed a complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act on 05.03.2013 and lodged FIR No. 252/2013 under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC on 25.06.2013, alleging dowry demands and cruelty.

The Petitioners moved the High Court to quash both proceedings, arguing they were maliciously filed as an afterthought following the divorce.

The court applied Section 498A IPC, noting that "cruelty simplicitor" is insufficient; it must involve intent to cause grave injury or coerce unlawful demands (*Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat*).

For Section 406 IPC, the court required proof of "entrustment" and "dishonest misappropriation".

Regarding the DV Act, the court relied on Section 2(f) defining "domestic relationship" and the principle that such a relationship ends upon a valid divorce decree (*Kuldeep Kaur v. Swaran Kaur*).

Finally, the court applied the "Bhajan Lal" guidelines (*State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal*) for quashing proceedings where allegations are manifestly mala fide or fail to disclose an offence.

The Court observed that the Respondent’s allegations were "vague, omnibus, and devoid of specific instances".

Regarding Section 498A, the Court found no evidence of physical violence or specific dowry demands; the claims regarding family members' liquor habits and financial control were deemed "ordinary wear and tear of marital life" rather than criminal cruelty.

Under Section 406, the Respondent failed to describe the specific jewellery items or identify whom they were entrusted to.

Most significantly, the Court noted that the "domestic relationship" required for the DV Act had ceased to exist on 05.09.2012 upon the grant of the divorce decree, which occurred before the Respondent filed the DV complaint and FIR.

The Court concluded the proceedings were an "afterthought" and a "gross abuse of the process of law" intended to harass the Petitioners after the husband successfully obtained a divorce.

The High Court allowed both petitions and quashed FIR No. 252/2013 (U/s 498A/406/34 IPC) and Complaint Case No. 494/2016 (under the DV Act), along with all consequential proceedings.