Victim’s Right of Appeal Under Section 372 CrPC Excludes Challenges to Inadequacy of Sentence

The Appellant (injured/complainant) filed an appeal under Section 372 of the CrPC challenging the inadequacy of the sentence awarded to Respondent No. 2 (Accused).

The Accused was convicted under Section 307 of the IPC for firing a gunshot at the Appellant on September 18, 2011, after she refused his marriage proposal.

The Trial Court sentenced the Accused to three years of simple imprisonment plus a fine.

While the Accused filed a separate appeal against the conviction (CRL.A. 316/2015), the Appellant filed the present appeal specifically seeking an enhancement of the sentence, arguing it was disproportionate to the gravity of the firearm injury.

1. Whether an appeal preferred by a victim under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC is maintainable solely for the purpose of seeking enhancement of sentence on the ground of inadequacy.

Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), which stipulates that no appeal lies from any judgment except as provided by the Code, with the proviso limiting a victim's right of appeal to orders of acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence, or inadequate compensation.

Section 377 of the CrPC, which vests the exclusive power to appeal against the inadequacy of a sentence in the State Government.

The precedent Parvinder Kansal v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020) 19 SCC 496, which establishes that "victim" as defined in the CrPC does not have a statutory right to challenge the length of a sentence.

The Court reasoned that the right of appeal is a creature of statute and must be exercised strictly within the boundaries defined by the legislature.

Upon examining the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, the Court noted that while the legislature expressly allowed victims to appeal against "inadequate compensation," it conspicuously omitted the right to appeal against "inadequate sentence".

The Court observed that Section 377 CrPC provides a specific mechanism for addressing sentence inadequacy, but this power is reserved solely for the State.

Consequently, even though the Appellant argued that the three-year sentence was grossly lenient for a Section 307 IPC offence involving a firearm, the Court held that it could not use its powers under Section 386 CrPC to bypass these substantive statutory limitations to enhance a sentence at the behest of a victim.

The Court answered the legal issue in the negative, stating that the remedy for sentence inadequacy lies exclusively under Section 377 CrPC via the State. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed as non-maintainable without further deliberation on the merits of the sentencing quantum.