01Facts
The Petitioner, an anti-trafficking NGO, originally filed a Writ Petition in 2004 highlighting systemic failures in the rescue and rehabilitation of victims of Commercial Sexual Exploitation (CSE).
pp. 15-16The petition alleged that victims were treated as criminals rather than survivors due to the absence of a "Victim Protection Plan".
pp. 16-17In 2015, the Union of India committed to: (i) establishing an Organized Crime Investigation Agency (OCIA) and (ii) enacting a comprehensive anti-trafficking law.
pp. 22-23Based on these undertakings, the Court disposed of the writ on 09.12.2015.
p. 22However, the proposed Bills (2018, 2021) lapsed or were never introduced.
pp. 25-26The Union later shifted its stance, arguing that the amendment to the NIA Act, 2019 (adding trafficking as a scheduled offence) and the enactment of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, rendered a separate law and the OCIA unnecessary.
pp. 27, 35-36The Petitioner filed this application seeking compliance with the 2015 directions.
p. 2602Issues
i.1. Whether, on a combined reading of Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution, victims of trafficking for CSE are entitled to a fundamental right to rehabilitation?
¶ 80 / p. 38ii.2. Whether the current legislative and institutional framework contains gaps regarding the rescue, protection, and rehabilitation of CSE victims?
¶ 80 / p. 38iii.3. Whether the Court should direct the constitution of the Organised Crime Investigation Agency (OCIA)?
¶ 80 / p. 3803Law Applied
The Court applied Article 21 (Right to Life and Dignity) and Article 23 (Prohibition of Traffic in Human Beings) of the Constitution, establishing that "rehabilitation" is a mandatory constitutional obligation and not a secondary welfare measure.
¶ 278, 281It relied on Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. UOI and Neeraja Chaudhary v. State of M.P., which held that rescue without rehabilitation violates Article 21 as it forces victims back into exploitation.
¶ 278-280The Court also interpreted the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act (ITPA), 1956, noting its conflation of sex trafficking and prostitution.
¶ 318Section 143 of the BNS, 2023, which defines trafficking based on the Palermo Protocol but erroneously requires a "means" element even for children.
¶ 199, 204Finally, it applied the separation of powers doctrine from UOI v. K. Pushpavanam, ruling that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to compel the legislature to enact a law.
¶ 381Provisions in the judgment · 61 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 18 provisions
Section 2Section 3Section 4Section 5Section 6Section 7Section 8Section 9Section 10Section 13Section 15Section 16Section 17Section 19Section 20Section 21Section 22Section 23Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 Section 62Section 111Section 127Section 143Section 144
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Section 173Section 395Section 396Section 398
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. 13 provisions
Section 1Section 2Section 3Section 29Section 30Section 31Section 36Section 37Section 39Section 40Section 46Section 53Section 107Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 14 provisions
Section 3Section 5Section 7Section 9Section 11Section 13Section 14Section 15Section 16Section 19Section 28Section 29Section 30Section 37National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 Section 3Section 4Section 6Section 7Section 8Section 10
Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 Section 4
04Reasoning
The Court found that while the Union argued existing laws were sufficient, a "vacuum" persisted because the ITPA and BNS focus overwhelmingly on criminalization (the "crime-suppression" approach) while marginalizing victim rights.
¶ 251-253The Court analyzed Section 17 of the ITPA, noting it imposes a "one-size-fits-all" institutionalization model that fails to distinguish between involuntary victims and adult voluntary sex workers, the latter of whom the Court held should not be "rescued" against their will per Budhadev Karmaskar v. State of W.B.
¶ 327-332It reasoned that "dignity" under Article 21 requires that rehabilitation be non-coercive and based on "informed consent," as forced detention in "protective homes" mirrors carceral punishment rather than restoration.
¶ 289, 347-348Regarding the OCIA, the Court reasoned that since the NIA Act now empowers a central agency to investigate trafficking, it cannot mandate the creation of a parallel body (OCIA) without overstepping its constitutional bounds into policy and legislative domains.
¶ 378, 38605Holding
The Court held that victims of trafficking for CSE have a fundamental right to rehabilitation under Articles 21 and 23.
¶ 281It found a significant "legislative and institutional vacuum" and therefore issued a comprehensive, 32-point "Victim Protection Plan" in exercise of powers under Articles 32 and 142 to hold the field until a law is enacted. Key directions include: (i) mandatory threshold inquiry by Magistrates to identify voluntary sex workers to prevent their detention [p. 216-218]; (ii) primacy of victim consent in final rehabilitation orders [p. 220]; (iii) strengthening of District-level AHTUs as notified police stations [p. 204-205]; and (iv) mandatory individual care plans and skill-building in protective homes [p. 230-232].
¶ 303, 362The prayer for OCIA was declined.
¶ 386The Court recommended the Union remove the "means" requirement for child trafficking in BNS [para. 418] and consider "open-shelter" models [para. 406]. States were directed to designate Nodal Officers and notify welfare organizations within three months [para. 456-457].
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PrajwalavsUnion Of India .
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