Widow’s Suit To Enforce Husband’s 1982 Land Agreement Fails As Karnataka HC Upholds Time Bar; Filed 11 Years After Fragmentation Act Repeal

The plaintiff sought specific performance of an unregistered agreement dated 13 January 1982, allegedly executed by the defendant in favour of her late husband for ₹3,000.

She claimed that the full consideration had been paid and possession delivered, and that the sale deed was to be executed after repeal of the Karnataka Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1966.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit, finding that the agreement had not been proved, was unenforceable, and that the suit was time-barred.

The First Appellate Court affirmed that decision; the plaintiff appealed under Section 100 CPC.

Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes three years for a suit for specific performance, running from the date fixed for performance or, where no date is fixed, from notice of refusal; the courts treated the repeal of the Fragmentation Act as the point when performance became due.

The court applied the requirement that a plaintiff seeking specific performance prove readiness and willingness, and relied on the Karnataka decisions in Smt. Parvathamma v. Smt. Uma (2011 (3) KCCR 2345) and T. Muniyappa v. H. Eshwar Sa (2012 (4) KLJ 653) concerning agreements made during the subsistence of the Fragmentation Act.

Under Sections 101 of the Evidence Act and Order III Rules 1–2 CPC, the burden remained on the plaintiff to prove the agreement; Thiruvengada Pillai v. Navaneethammal, AIR 2008 SC 1541, was cited on that burden, and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. Indusind Bank Ltd., AIR 2005 SC 439, for the rule that a power-of-attorney holder cannot testify to matters within the principal’s personal knowledge.

The High Court also applied the Section 100 CPC limitation on second appeals to cases involving a substantial question of law.

The courts below found that the plaintiff’s power-of-attorney holder had no personal knowledge of the transaction and that the testimony of the alleged attesting witness was unreliable; the plaintiff herself did not testify, and other material witnesses were not called.

The courts therefore held that execution of the agreement was not proved.

They also found the agreement unenforceable because it was made while the Fragmentation Act was in force and related to land treated as a fragment.

On limitation, the courts treated repeal of the Act as the point when performance became due, and concluded that the 2002 suit was filed more than three years later; the extended inaction also supported the finding that readiness and willingness had not been established.

The High Court held that these concurrent factual findings were neither perverse nor contrary to the record and did not raise a substantial question of law.

Finding no substantial question of law, it dismissed the second appeal and left the judgments and decrees of the courts below undisturbed.