Woman Died Days After Alleged Rape; Jharkhand HC Sets Aside Conviction Over Contradictory Testimony

The prosecution alleged that Pachhu Sao raped Masomat Kabutri in a field on 26 December 1992, and that she died after consuming poison four days later.

The case, initially registered as an unnatural-death inquiry, led to an FIR under Sections 376 and 306 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The Sessions Court convicted the appellant under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine.

He appealed, challenging the reliability of the witnesses and pointing to the delay in lodging the FIR and the absence of medical or forensic proof.

The High Court assessed the trial evidence, including the alleged eyewitness’s testimony, the other witnesses’ evidence, and the medical and investigative evidence.

The conviction was for the offence under Section 376 IPC.

The Court stated that a conviction for rape may rest on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix if that testimony is wholly reliable and unblemished.

As the victim had died, however, the prosecution case had to be assessed on the evidence of the witnesses examined at trial.

The judgment cites no precedents or further statutory provisions as the basis for its decision.

The Court found the prosecution evidence insufficiently reliable.

Although PW-1 claimed to have witnessed the rape and caught the appellant, he admitted that he did not report the incident or tell anyone about it; the Court considered this, along with PW-2’s account, to cast serious doubt on their veracity.

The remaining witnesses were not eyewitnesses, and their accounts were found exaggerated or contradictory.

The medical witnesses reported no apparent injuries, the investigating officer found no signs of struggle, the cause of death was not established by authentic evidence, and the FIR was lodged well after the alleged incident.

Taken together, these deficiencies left the prosecution’s allegation unproved to the standard required to sustain the conviction.

It allowed the appeal, discharged the appellant from his bail bond and discharged the sureties; any pending interlocutory applications were also disposed of.