Writ courts should ordinarily not interfere with show-cause notices absent jurisdictional defect, abuse, or a predetermined mind.

The respondent operated a BPCL retail outlet under a Dispensing Pump and Selling License.

An inspection on 15–16 March 2016 recorded alleged short supply of petroleum products; the inspection report was countersigned by the respondent’s employees.

The dispensing units were later examined by their manufacturer, who reported soldering that was not part of the original product.

BPCL issued a show-cause notice proposing action, including termination, on 24 October 2017.

The respondent challenged the notice under Article 226, and the Single Judge quashed it, relying on delay under Clause 8.5.6 of the Marketing Discipline Guidelines 2012 (MDG 2012) and the alleged absence of material attributing tampering to the respondent.

BPCL appealed under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005.

1. Whether the time requirement in Clause 8.5.6 of the MDG 2012 is mandatory, such that non-compliance invalidated the show-cause notice.

2. Whether the show-cause notice was issued with a predetermined or premeditated mind, permitting the Court to intervene before completion of the disciplinary proceedings.

3. Whether the Single Judge was justified in assessing the allegations and effectively deciding their merits at the show-cause stage.

The Supreme Court held in Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. R.M. Service Centre, (2019) 19 SCC 662, that timeframes expressed as “preferably” in the MDG are directory, not mandatory; they are intended to streamline procedure and do not, by themselves, invalidate action for delay.

Under Union of India v. Vicco Laboratories, (2007) 13 SCC 270, courts ordinarily should not interfere with a show-cause notice, but may do so where it is issued without jurisdiction or in abuse of process; a mere assertion of such defects is insufficient, and interference is generally inappropriate where factual adjudication is required.

The Court applied these principles to review the notice under Article 226 and the Single Judge’s intervention at the notice stage.

The Court found that Clause 8.5.6 was directory and that the case concerned alleged short supply, not adulteration; on the facts presented, delay did not establish prejudice sufficient to invalidate the notice.

The notice set out the material relied upon and called on the respondent to explain why action should not be taken, including termination; the Court therefore found no indication of a predetermined decision.

The inspection report had been countersigned without recorded objection, while whether the respondent was absent deliberately and the substance of the allegations remained disputed factual matters for BPCL to determine.

The Single Judge should not have resolved those merits or given the respondent a “clean chit” before the disciplinary process was completed.

It directed BPCL to conclude the proceedings within three months from 23 October 2026 and directed the respondent to appear for a personal hearing on that date.

If the respondent failed to appear, BPCL could proceed on the basis of the existing reply without granting another hearing date.