Writ Jurisdiction Cannot Be Invoked Against Legislators for Private Land Disputes or Legislative Acts.

The appellant instituted a civil suit on 20.06.1995, which was decreed on 19.09.2007, granting a decree of permanent injunction and directing issuance of Patta in his favour; the decree attained finality and the suit property stood mutated in the appellant's name.

Respondent No. 6, Sitasharan Sharma, who is the Speaker of the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly, initiated repeated demarcation proceedings through the revenue authorities, sought demolition of the appellant's property, and raised questions concerning the dispute in the Vidhan Sabha.

Despite representations by the appellant, the revenue authorities continued to act, and an FIR was registered against the appellant.

The appellant filed W.P. No. 40877 of 2025 seeking a writ of prohibition on the ground that the revenue authorities lacked jurisdiction to reopen issues adjudicated by the Civil Court.

The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition on 27.10.2025, holding that the appellant's appropriate remedy was execution of the decree, that his apprehension of dispossession was speculative, and granted liberty to pursue his pending representation.

The appellant challenged this dismissal in the present writ appeal.

1. Whether a writ of prohibition can be issued against revenue authorities in anticipation that their action may be without jurisdiction, where no adverse order or coercive action has been taken against the appellant.

2. Whether a writ can be issued against Respondent No. 6, an MLA/Speaker, for raising questions in the Legislative Assembly, and whether the dispute with him can be treated as anything other than a private dispute.

3. Whether the civil court decree dated 19.09.2007 bars demarcation proceedings by revenue authorities and is binding upon Respondent No. 6, who was not a party to the decree.

4. Whether a writ can be issued to stop action on the basis of an FIR or to direct non-registration of an FIR against the appellant.

The Court considered the settled principle that a writ of prohibition issues to prevent statutory or administrative authorities from acting without or in excess of jurisdiction.

The appellant's invocation of Article 300A of the Constitution protecting the right to property.

Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, (2024) 1 SCC 185, concerning monitoring of criminal cases against legislators.

Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226, holding that a Minister's supervisory powers do not extend to interfering with the course of investigation and prosecution in individual cases.

Principles that writ jurisdiction does not lie against private persons, that legislative acts of Members of Assembly are immune from writs, and that disputed questions of fact and civil disputes are not examinable under writ jurisdiction.

The Court distinguished both precedents cited by the appellant, holding that Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay concerns judicial monitoring of criminal proceedings against MPs/MLAs and does not establish that a writ can be issued against a legislator.

Relating to Respondent No. 6, the Court found that raising a question in the Legislative Assembly is a purely legislative act, immune from writ jurisdiction, and that the appellant's grievance against Respondent No. 6 was a personal land-demarcation dispute which could not acquire the character of a State dispute merely because Respondent No. 6 is an MLA.

Regarding Respondents No. 1 to 5, the Court reasoned they are competent authorities duty-bound to act when approached; demarcation disputes lie within the domain of revenue authorities, and a civil court decree cannot decide demarcation.

The Court held that any action taken without jurisdiction may be challenged in accordance with law, but no writ can be issued in anticipation that the action may be without jurisdiction.

On the FIR, the Court held that the appellant's remedy lies in challenging it under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and no writ could issue to stall action based thereon.

Since no execution proceedings, notice, or adverse order existed on record, the apprehension of dispossession was unsupported; revenue authorities' actions amounted only to verification of facts, and allegations against Respondent No. 6 raised disputed questions of fact not examinable in writ proceedings.

Finding no error in the order dated 27.10.2025 of the learned Single Judge, the Court dismissed the appeal as devoid of merit, with liberty to the appellant to pursue his pending representation before the competent authorities in accordance with law.