Writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked for registration of FIR without exhausting alternative statutory remedies.

In brief

The question

1. Whether a High Court can, under Article 226 of the Constitution, direct State authorities to register an FIR without the applicant first exhausting alternative statutory remedies

The court held

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court’s interim order; the Court held that the writ petition was premature

It also directed

Consequently, FIR No. 0194/2025, which was registered solely pursuant to the High Court's direction, was quashed

Liberty was reserved for the Complainant to pursue alternative statutory remedies under the BNSS, and the competent forums were directed to consider such grievances on their own merits without being influenced by the observations in this judgment

01Facts

The dispute involves a resort property in Nashik developed by the Complainant Company

pp. 2-3

Following a series of commercial leases and sub-leases amid corporate insolvency proceedings, civil litigation was initiated regarding unauthorized constructions and property rights

p. 4

In 2025, the Complainant alleged that the Appellants used forged documents and impersonation to mislead Revenue officials during a land measurement process

pp. 4-5

Although the Land Records Authority and local police initially declined to register an FIR, advising the parties to seek redress from competent authorities, the Complainant filed a Writ Petition under Article 226

pp. 6-7

The High Court of Bombay, via an interim order, directed the police to record statements and initiate "necessary action," resulting in the registration of FIR No. 0194/2025

p. 8

02Issues

i.1. Whether a High Court can, under Article 226 of the Constitution, direct State authorities to register an FIR without the applicant first exhausting alternative statutory remedies

p. 2 / para. 3

ii.2. Whether the extraordinary writ jurisdiction should be exercised in cases involving commercial disputes and alleged police inaction when specific procedural remedies exist under the BNSS

pp. 16-17 / para. 7-9

03Law Applied

The Court applied the doctrine of "exhaustion of alternative remedies," emphasizing that Article 226 is discretionary and extraordinary

p. 9

It relied on Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. and Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes, which dictate that writ jurisdiction should not bypass statutory machinery.

p. 9, 11

Specifically regarding FIR registration, the Court followed Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. and Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage, establishing that an aggrieved party must first approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) of the BNSS (formerly Section 154(3) CrPC) and subsequently the Magistrate under Section 175(3) BNSS (formerly Section 156(3) CrPC) before seeking a Writ of Mandamus

pp. 13, 15, 16-17

Provisions in the judgment · 16 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Section 14

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 Section 61 Section 318 Section 319 Section 335 Section 336 Section 337 Section 338 Section 340

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Section 173 Section 175

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 36 Section 154 Section 156 Section 200 Section 482

04Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the High Court erred by entertaining the Writ Petition at the first instance

p. 17

It observed that the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) provides a structured, sequential mechanism for redressal—starting from the police station to the Superintendent and then to the Magistrate

pp. 16-17

The Supreme Court found that the Complainant had not moved the Superintendent or the Magistrate before rushing to the High Court

p. 17

Since there was no imminent danger to life or liberty, the High Court’s intervention bypassed the statutory scheme, effectively acting as a forum of first instance, which is impermissible under established precedents like Radha Krishan Industries

p. 18

The Court noted that the background of the dispute was commercial and civil in nature, further necessitating caution against bypassing standard criminal procedure

p. 17