Writ Jurisdiction Cannot Be Invoked To Challenge Consequential Orders When Statutory Appeal Remedy Against Original Order Remains Unexhausted

The petitioners challenged a consequential order dated 18.06.2026 issued by the Guwahati Metropolitan Development Authority (GMDA), which scheduled the demolition of their brick boundary wall and house at Dharapur for 06.07.2026.

This order followed a primary demolition order dated 19.11.2025, issued under Section 88 of the GMDA Act, 1985, after the petitioners failied to produce valid planning permits despite being served a show-cause notice on 02.07.2025 and attending a hearing on 06.08.2025.

The petitioners approached the High Court under Article 226 without challenging the original demolition order of 19.11.2025.

1. Whether a writ petition challenging only a consequential execution order is maintainable when the original demolition order remains unchallenged.

2. Whether the petitioners have an efficacious alternative statutory remedy under the GMDA Act, 1985.

Section 88 [of the Guwahati Metropolitan Development Authority Act, 1985] empowers the authority to direct the demolition of unauthorized constructions.

Chapter VIII (Sections 71, 72, and 73) mandates the appointment of an Appellate Authority, having the qualifications of a District Judge, to hear appeals against GMDA orders.

Section 72(2) stipulates a one-month limitation period for filing appeals but grants the Appellate Authority discretionary power to condone delays for sufficient reasons.

Per Government Notification GDD.49/94/Pt/44, the District & Sessions Judge, Kamrup, is the designated Appellate Authority.

The Court observed that the impugned order dated 18.06.2026 was merely an administrative step to implement the original quasi-judicial order of 19.11.2025.

Since the petitioners failed to challenge the primary order of 19.11.2025, the Court held that the consequential order could not be interfered with.

Furthermore, the Court noted that the GMDA Act provides a robust statutory appellate mechanism where the Appellate Authority possesses the powers of a Civil Court to take evidence and compel the production of documents.

Although the statutory limitation period of one month had expired, the Court highlighted that Section 72(2) expressly allows for the condonation of delay.

Consequently, the Court found it inappropriate to exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction when a specialized statutory forum was available to adjudicate the merits and facts of the unauthorized construction.

The Court granted the petitioners liberty to file an appeal before the designated Appellate Authority (District & Sessions Judge, Kamrup) within one month from the date of the judgment.

The Appellate Authority was directed to consider any application for condonation of delay in accordance with law and decide the appeal on its own merits without being influenced by the High Court's observations regarding the maintainability of the writ.