Writ jurisdiction should not bypass an efficacious statutory appeal where natural justice claims involve disputed facts.

The Petitioner arrived in India carrying a 117-gram gold bar, which was detained by the Customs Authorities on 28.01.2024 under Detention Receipt No. 3635.

The Respondent relied on a statement allegedly recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, asserting that the Petitioner admitted non-declaration of the gold and waived the requirements of a Show Cause Notice and personal hearing.

The Respondent further claimed that an oral Show Cause Notice was issued under the proviso to Section 124 of the Act on 27.01.2024, and that the Petitioner subsequently requested waiver of the Show Cause Notice and personal hearing by communication dated 02.02.2024.

After appraisal of the gold bar on 02.02.2024, the adjudicating authority passed an Order-in-Original dated 15.04.2024 ordering its absolute confiscation.

The Petitioner approached the High Court under Articles 226 and 227, challenging the confiscation, seeking release of the gold bar, and waiver of detention or warehouse charges.

He contended that no valid Show Cause Notice had been issued, that the statement under Section 108 was improperly obtained, and that waiver could not dispense with the mandatory requirements of Section 124.

Whether the High Court should exercise its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to examine the challenge to the Order-in-Original dated 15.04.2024 despite the availability of a statutory appellate remedy under the Customs Act, 1962.

Whether the Petitioner’s allegations concerning the non-issuance of a valid Show Cause Notice, the voluntariness and recording of the Section 108 statement, and the alleged waiver of personal hearing justified bypassing the statutory appellate mechanism.

The Court applied the principle that the existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not constitute an absolute bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226, but ordinarily requires judicial self-restraint where the remedy is efficacious.

Relying on Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Ors., (1998) 8 SCC 1, the Court recognised that writ jurisdiction may nevertheless be exercised in cases involving violation of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, or a challenge to the vires of legislation.

The Court also considered the procedural requirements under Sections 108 and 124 of the Customs Act, 1962, including the recording of statements, issuance of a Show Cause Notice before confiscation, and the relevance of any alleged waiver.

However, disputed factual questions concerning compliance with these requirements were held to be more appropriately examined by the statutory appellate authority.

The Court held that the Petitioner’s grievance was directed against a concluded adjudicatory order rather than merely an apprehended or ongoing coercive action.

Since the Customs Act provided a statutory appellate mechanism, the Petitioner could challenge the legality of the confiscation, compliance with Section 124, the evidentiary value and voluntariness of the Section 108 statement, and the alleged waiver before the appellate authority.

Although breach of natural justice can justify intervention despite an alternative remedy, the Court found that the present challenge depended on disputed factual matters—whether an oral Show Cause Notice was actually given, what was communicated to the Petitioner, whether the statement was voluntarily recorded, and whether the waiver was conscious and valid.

These matters required examination of the contemporaneous adjudication record and were therefore unsuitable for determination in writ proceedings at this stage.

The Court expressly left open all issues concerning the validity of the Section 108 statement, the alleged oral Show Cause Notice, waiver of the Show Cause Notice and personal hearing, applicability of Ms. Shubhangi Gupta v. Commissioner of Customs & Ors., and the legality of the confiscation.

If the Petitioner availed the statutory remedy within four weeks, the appellate authority was directed to consider limitation in accordance with law, uninfluenced by the time spent in the writ proceedings; any application for condonation of delay was to be considered on its own merits.