Writ jurisdiction should ordinarily not be invoked for non-registration of FIRs when statutory remedies exist.

The petitioner claimed ancestral ownership over Khasra No. 159/2, admeasuring 0.324 hectares, situated at Village Sagouni Khurd. A dispute concerning widening of a pathway over the relevant land had proceeded before the Tehsildar under Sections 131 and 132 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. The matter was remanded by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, following which the Tehsildar passed an order dated 8 May 2026.

The petitioner alleged that private respondents Nos. 4 to 10 were attempting to dispossess him and had assaulted, abused, and criminally intimidated him. He submitted complaints to the concerned police station and to the Superintendent of Police, but alleged that no action had been taken.

Invoking Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner sought directions to the Superintendent of Police to take coercive action, register a criminal case, and decide his pending representations. The State opposed the petition on the ground that the petitioner had an efficacious alternative remedy under Sections 156(3), 200, and 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

1. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 seeking registration of an FIR and police action should be entertained when the petitioner has statutory remedies under Sections 154(3), 156(3), and 200 of the CrPC, or the corresponding provisions of the BNSS?

2. Whether the petitioner should be relegated to the jurisdiction of the competent Magistrate for registration of the case and investigation?

The Court applied the principle that although the police must register an FIR where information discloses a cognizable offence, an aggrieved person must ordinarily pursue the statutory remedies before invoking writ jurisdiction. Under Section 154(3) CrPC, the complainant may approach the Superintendent of Police; under Section 156(3) CrPC, the Magistrate may direct registration of an FIR, order proper investigation, and monitor the investigation; and under Section 200 CrPC, the complainant may institute a private criminal complaint.

Relying principally on Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., (2008) 2 SCC 409, Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage, (2016) 6 SCC 277, M. Subramaniam v. S. Janaki, and Shweta Bhadoriya v. State of M.P., (2017) 1 MPLJ (Cri) 338, the Court held that the High Court should ordinarily not entertain a writ petition merely complaining of non-registration of an FIR or improper investigation.

The Court also referred to Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437, which reaffirmed the mandatory nature of FIR registration upon disclosure of a cognizable offence and the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC, corresponding to Section 175 BNSS.

The petitioner’s allegations concerned alleged trespass, assault, abuse, and criminal intimidation, but his immediate grievance was the alleged failure of the police to register a case or act on his representations.

The Court held that the statutory criminal-procedure framework specifically addressed such grievances. The petitioner had already approached the Superintendent of Police, and, if dissatisfied with the result, could approach the competent Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC or the corresponding BNSS provision.

The Magistrate possessed adequate powers to direct registration of an FIR, order a proper investigation, and monitor it, making the alternative remedy efficacious.

Applying the rule in Sakiri Vasu and the subsequent authorities, the Court declined to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction merely because the police had allegedly failed to act.

The petition was accordingly dismissed, with liberty to the petitioner to approach the competent Magistrate under the applicable provisions of the CrPC or BNSS for redressal of his grievance.